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regime.

* Senior Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International
Law. Comments and criticisms welcome at: maupin@mpil.de. For helpful feedback and conversations, I thank the participants in workshops held at Duke and Yale Law Schools and at the American
Society of International Law (2012 Biennial International Economic Law Interest Group meeting
2012). Particular thanks go to Bruce Ackerman, Curt Bradley, Rachel Brewster, Guy Charles, PierreMarie Dupuy, Mitu Gulati, Laurence Helfer, Jiirgen Kurtz, Ralf Michaels, Joost Pauwelyn, W. Michael Reisman, Anthea Roberts, David Schneiderman, and Jorge Vifluales.

368

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 54:2

Introduction
..........................................
369
I.
Whence International Investment Law's Public/Private Crisis?....373
A.
Unanticipated Evolutionary Twists and Turns ..................... 375
B.
Structural Peculiarities
..........................
379
1.
The Sweeping Global Coverage of Investment
Instruments.
............................
379
2.
The Broad and Evolving Notion of
"Investment"
........................... 380
3.
Vague Treaty Standards and the Elision of Rights
and Interests
......................
..... 382
4.
Extra-Democratic Dispute Settlement ...................... 385
C.
What's Really At Stake? Three Examples of
Public/Private Clashes ............
................. 387
1.
A Private Concession in Public Infrastructure
Services: Suez et al. v. Argentina ........
......... 387
2.
Private Financing of Public Debt: Abaclat v.
Argentina ..
.............................
388
3.
Private Property in Public Health Hazards: Philip
Morris v. Australia ........................
390
D.
Categorical Accounts: Private Dispute Settlement or
Public Governance?.......................
393
1.
Private Dispute Settlement Framing ......
...... 394
2.
Transnational Public Governance Regime
... ..... 397
Framing
......................
...... 399
3.
Evaluating the Two Paradigms .........
II.
Between Rhetoric and Reality: International Investment Law's
Public/Private Overlaps and Disjunctions ................. 401
..... 401
Public and Private Actors and Functions ........
A.
B.
Public International Law and Private International Law
..... 406
................
Sources and Methods
C.
Public Law and Private Law Claims and Defenses...............409
D.
What's Left: Public and Private as Decision Rules?..............413
..... 416
.................
III. The Integrated Systems Approach
A.
Integrated Systems Analysis and its Potential Utility ........... 417
B.
Three Illustrations: How Integrated Systems Analysis
Can Be Used To Reshape International
422
Investment Law .........................
...... 422
.................
1.
A Textual Reform
....... 424
2.
An Institutional Reform ..........
.............
.....
427
3.
An Enforcement Reform
4.
Summary of Integrated Systems Based Reforms.....430
C.
Comparing the Integrated Systems Approach to the
Alternatives
................................. 431

2014]

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN INVESTMENT LAw

1.
2.
3.
Conclusion

369

The Status Quo Alternative .............................. 431
The Multilateralization Alternative.............................432
The Abolition Alternative ..................
433
..............................
.................. 435
INTRODUCTION

Imagine a world in which the line between personal rights in property
or contract and important public policy concerns - say environmental
protection or public health - is drawn in the following way. The individual who seeks vindication of her property rights against governmental regulatory encroachment appoints an arbitrator to hear her claim. She selects
the arbitrator she believes most likely to find in her favor, given the arbitrator's record of past decisions. The government whose regulatory measure
prompted the complaint responds by appointing the arbitrator it believes
most likely to absolve it of liability. A third arbitrator is then selected to
chair the three-person panel by a designated appointing authority - perhaps the secretariat of some international arbitral institution. All of the
arbitrators are lawyers by training, but none hails from the country whose
sovereign act forms the basis of the complaint.
The disputing parties then proceed to pay each of the three arbitrators a
substantial daily feel to consider whether the maligned governmental regulation improperly impaired the property owner's rights, and if so, how
much compensation the government should pay the owner as a result. The
tribunal's award, once issued, cannot be reviewed on the merits by any
domestic court,2 and the property owner can enforce a favorable award by
attaching state assets in 149 countries around the world.3 Upon termina1. The going rate in cases administered by the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) is $3000 per arbitrator per day. See ICSID, SCHEDULE OF FEES (Jan. 1, 2013),
available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal
=scheduledFees&reqFrom=Main. Other arbitral institutions set arbitrator compensation at a prespecified percentage of the amount claimed; see, e.g., INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ARBITRATION
AND ADR RULES, app. III (2012), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/Products-and-Services/Arbitr
ation-and-ADR/Arbitration/Rules-of-arbitration/Download-ICC-Rules-of-Arbitration/ICC-Rules-o
f-Arbitration-in-several-languages/.
2. Except on the limited procedural grounds set out under art. 52 of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, openedfor signature Mar.
18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention], or, in some cases, under
art. V of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention].
3. Subject to certain sovereign immunity defenses, enforcement of investor-state arbitration
awards is generally governed by the ICSID Convention, supra note 2, at 53-55, or the New York
Convention, supra note 2, arts. III-V. As of the date of this writing, both conventions listed 149
contracting state parties. See Lirt of ContractingStates and Other Signatoriesof the Convention, ICSID (2013)
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=Contract
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tion of the arbitral proceedings, the three-person tribunal dissolves and its
members continue with their various other professional pursuits. 4
It seems fair to say that few domestic legal scholars, if starting with a
clean slate, would likely propose this set-up as an optimal system for resolving conflicts between privately held rights and important public policy
concerns. But the world I have just described is not a fictional one: it is the
contemporary international investment law regime. The property owners
in question are foreign investors, and the government appearing as defendant might be that of most nations in the world.
Germany is currently facing an $18.7 billion dollar claim by Swedish energy investors over the German government's decision to phase out nuclear power in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear accident.5 Australia is preparing to defend a multi-billion dollar claim by Philip Morris brought in
response to that country's recently enacted Tobacco Plain Packaging legislation. 6 Belgium faces a $2.3 billion dollar claim by a Chinese insurance
company as a result of the government bailout and then sale of a BelgianDutch bank during the recent financial crisis. 7 All of these claims will be
adjudicated in the manner described above. And Germany, Australia, and
Belgium are actually quite lucky in the grand scheme of things: they are
only now facing their first investor-state claims. The United States, by contrast, has already faced over twenty such claims8 by foreign investors seeking compensation for an array of governmental measures ranging from a
California environmental regulation 9 to a Mississippi state jury verdict.10
ingstates&ReqFrom=Main (listing state party signatories to the ICSID Convention) (last visited Mar.
10, 2014); ContradingStates, NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION, http://www.newyorkconventi
on.org/contracting-states (last visited Mar. 10, 2014) (listing state party signatories to the New York
Convention) (last visited Mar. 10, 2014).
4. Typically as law firm partners, arbitrators, expert witnesses, full or part-time law school professors, or some combination.
5. Vattenfall AB v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12 (award pending);
Vattenfall Launches Second Claim Against Germany, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (June 25, 2012),
http://www.globalarbitrationteview.com/news/artide/30634/vattenfall-launches-second-claim-agai
nst-germany/.
6. Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Notice of Arbitration (Nov. 21, 2011), available at http://www.ag.
gov.au/Internationarelations/InternationalLaw/Documents/Philip%2Morris%2Asia%20Limited
%20Notice%20of/o20Arbitration%2021%20November/o202011 .pdf.
7. Alyx Barker, Chinese Investors Take Belgium ICSID, 7 GLOBAL ARB. REV. 10 (2012).
8. See Investment Treaty Cases, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION, http://italaw.com/cases-byrespondent?field caserespondenttid=48 (last visited Mar. 10, 2014) (listing claims faced by the
United States under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA)).
9. Methanex Corp. v. United States, NAFTA (UNCITRAL rules), Final Award of the Tribunal
on Jurisdiction and Merits (Aug. 3, 2005), available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0529.pdf. Unless otherwise specified, all publicly available investor-state arbitral
awards discussed in this Article may be accessed at http://italaw.com/awards/chronological (last
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In fact, U.S. participation in the international investment law regime is
especially deep. The United States was a driving force behind the regime's
creation and continues to serve as one of its foremost supporters upon the
world stage. This seems puzzling in light of the fact that U.S. domestic law
contains more sophisticated and democratically legitimate means of handling conflicts between investor rights and broader governmental regulatory concerns than farming them out to ephemeral international arbitration
tribunals on a case-by-case basis.
International law scholars in the United States and abroad have by and
large reacted to this curious state of affairs in an even more curious manner. While many have begun to shine a critical spotlight on various aspects
of the international investment law system, most reform proposals have
worked outward from one of two initial premises. On one side of the debate are those who view recent investor-state arbitral awards granting
compensation to foreign investors for governmental regulatory activities as
evidence that international investment law has morphed into a defacto public governance system operating on a transnational scale.'1 On the other
extreme are those who insist that international investment law is of little or
no public concern, as it is nothing more than an institutional support
structure for the efficient settlement of private investment disputes.12
What is curious about these approaches is not only that they are both
overly broad and insufficiently nuanced, but that they both take the fundamental question facing the international investment law regime to be a
categorical one: is it a public regime or is it a private one? Divergent prescriptive recommendations then flow almost automatically - in conflicting directions - from the answer to this question. But it is possible to
visited Mar. 11, 2013).
10. The Loewen Group Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award (June 26,
2003).
11. See, most notably, Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitradon as a Species
of GlobalAdministrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 121 (2006); Gus VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2007); DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING
ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: INVESTMENT RULES AND DEMOCRACY'S PROMISE (2008);
SANTIAGO MONTT, STATE LIABILITY IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE BIT GENERATION (2009); INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010) [hereinafter III &
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW]; Stephan W. Schill, Enhancing InternationalInvestment Law's Legitimay:

Conceptual and MethodologicalFoundations of a New Pubc Law Approach, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 57 (2011)
[hereinafter Schill, New PublicLaw Approach].
12. Examples of works espousing the private dispute settlement perspective (by analogy to international commercial arbitration) include: Barton Legum, Investment Teaty Arbitration's Contribution to
InternationalCommercial Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. J., Aug.-Oct. 2005, at 70, 73; Charles N. Brower,
W(b)ither InternationalCommerdalArbitraion?,24 ARB. INT'L 181, 190 (2008); see also Anne van Aaken,
InternationalInvestment Law Between Commitment and Flexibility: A Contract Theory Ana sis, 12 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 507 (2009) (viewing the regime through the lens of private contract law).
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raise a different question in respect of the regime's ongoing classificatory
debate. Namely, does it even matter?
In this Article, I argue that it doesn't. I propose that the international
investment law regime and its most pressing problems should instead be
analyzed from an integrated systems perspective. That is, rather than asking what is it? (a classificatory question), we should focus on figuring out
how it works in real time and how it can be improved. How do different
aspects of the regime interact with one another? How does the regime as a
whole interact with other legal regimes at both the domestic and international levels? And most importantly, how are intra- and inter-regime feedback loops dynamically shifting the line between the protection of investor
and non-investor rights and interests over time? Only against the backdrop
of this more integrated understanding of the international investment law
system does it become possible to generate useful suggestions for targeted
regime reform, whether on a piecemeal or wholesale basis.
In order to make the case for an integrated systems approach to international investment law, the Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains
why the public/private framing has gained such salience in the international investment law world notwithstanding the fact that many other scholarly
traditions have consistently rejected this framing as unworkable. It describes some of the historical, structural, jurisprudential, and sociological
peculiarities contributing to the perception that international investment
law generates acute public/private tensions not typical of other areas of
international law. These peculiarities help explain why the scholarly debate
has so far focused on establishing whether international investment law is
a private dispute settlement system or a transnational public governance
system. I critique the descriptive utility of these dominant accounts from
three perspectives: those of the investor, the state, and the third-party outsider to the investor-state relationship.
Part II lays the groundwork for moving beyond this rudimentary debate. It does so by charting the overlaps and disjunctions between traditional public/private distinctions and the contemporary practice of international investment law. The discussion shows how the investment law
system impacts both public and private actors, incorporates both public
law and private law claims and defenses, and draws sources and methods
from both public international law and private international law. In light of
this clear straddling of classical public/private divides, I suggest that the
frequent invocation of public and private concepts within the international
investment law system has little to do with the system's essential nature.
Rather, it reflects strategic attempts by competing stakeholders to advance
certain contested propositions at the expense of others. This serves to obscure, rather than resolve, underlying normative tensions.
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Part III introduces the integrated systems perspective as an alternative
analytical tool. Since international investment law's public and private features are overlapping and at times even mutually constitutive, a better way
to analyze the regime is to view it as a complex dynamic system. To illustrate why the integrated systems perspective is useful, I apply it to the central question that has preoccupied most of the investment regime's critics:
how, where, and by whom is the line between investor rights and noninvestor rights (including, potentially, the "public interest') drawn?
In this Part, I propose three different places where making minor adjustments to discrete components of the existing regime could produce
significant re-alignments in the balance struck between investor and noninvestor rights and interests at other levels of the regime's functioning I
connect the three proposals back to the case studies developed in Part I in
order to show what difference each one might make in practice. My central
aim, however, is not to definitively establish the superiority of the three
specific proposals. Rather, it is to persuade reform advocates to take advantage of international investment law's many interlocking feedback
loops so as to strategically direct the regime's rapid evolution in an iterative
fashion.13 I argue that this represents the most productive strategy, in the
near term, for tackling the system's much touted accountability and legitimacy problems.
I.

WHENCE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW'S
PUBLIC/PRIVATE CRISIS?

The persistence and vehemence of the public/private debate within international investment law is in some ways baffling. A diverse array of
scholarly traditions has, over the course of a century, consistently trounced
the public/private distinction as artificial, unworkable, or even downright
pernicious. Legal realists began exposing the artificiality of the divide in
the early 1900s when they recast prevailing conceptions of "private" contract and property rights as mere reflections of coercive "public" political
power relations.14 New Deal theorists and their state action doctrine progeny then demonstrated the unworkability of the divide insofar as it relates
to state action versus inaction.15 Many eventually concluded, as Cass
13. My approach thus works within the existing regime and attempts to "build on the classic
model," as prominent investment arbitrator Charles Brower recently put it. Alison Ross, London: Build
On the Classic Model, Urges Brower, 7 GLOBAL ARB. REV., no. 3, 2012, at 44, 44.
14. See Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909); Robert Hale, Coeion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coenie State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923); Morris R. Cohen, Property and
Soveregnty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8 (1928).
15. For one account of the activist state literature, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING
AMERICAN LAW (1984).
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Sunstein put it, that "state action is always present." 6 As to perniciousness,
the use and abuse of public/private rhetoric to perpetuate dominant hierarchies and oppress dissenting voices has been a constant refrain of critical
legal scholars,' 7 feminists,' 8 and many others.' 9
Placed alongside this larger discourse, it seems likely that international
investment law's public/private debates are actually a microcosm of a
much older discussion. Why, then, have international investment law
scholars not learned from these other traditions? Why do we continue to
fixate on notions of public and private as if these held the key to solving
the regime's problems? There are four main answers to this riddle: one
historical, one structural, one jurisprudential, and one sociological. In what
follows, I take each in turn.
Before moving to these explanations, however, one preliminary caveat
bears mentioning. My goal, in this Part, is not to present the international
investment law regime in a comprehensive, nuanced, or even balanced
manner. Rather, it is to highlight the reasons why - rightly or wrongly a vocal segment of scholars, civil society advocates, journalists, government officials, and other critics has come to view the regime as an epic
battle between private investors and the public interest. Focusing on these
reasons to the exclusion of competing considerations inevitably makes the
presentation one-sided. Not all international investment disputes raise
public policy concerns. And among those that do, it is far from inevitable
that the final result will be an award that negatively impacts the public interest. 20 At the level of substantive law, some states have made significant

16. Cass R. Sunstein, State Action Is Always Present,3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 465 (2002); see also Harold W.
Horowitz, The MisleadingSearchfor "StateAction" Underthe FourteenthAmendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 208
(1957); William W. Van Alstyne & Kenneth L. Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1961); Charles
L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court 1966 Term: Foreword.: 'State Action," EqualProtection, and Cakfornia'sProposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967).
17. For an overview, see Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Dechne of the Public/PrivateDistinction,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982); Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Publc/PivateDistinction, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 1423, 1426 (1982).
18. See, e.g., Alan Freeman & Elizabeth Mensch, The Pubhc-Private Disdntion in American Lam and
Life, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 237 (1987); CHALLENGING THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: FEMINISM, LAW,
AND PUBLIC POLICY (Susan B. Boyd ed., 1997); PUBLIC AND PRIVATE: FEMINIST LEGAL DEBATES
(Margaret Thornton ed., 1995); Frances Olsen, ConsitutionalLaw: Feminist Critiquesof the Public/Private
Distinction, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 319 (1993).
19. See general#Jack M. Balkin, Deconstrucion's Legal Career,27 CARDOZO L. REV. 719, 728 (2005)
(noting that public and private power are at once mutually dependent and mutually differentiated).
20. For example, in Methanex Corp. v. United States, NAFTA (UNCITRAL rules), Final Award
of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits (Aug. 3, 2005), available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/ita0529.pdf, the tribunal did not find the United States financially liable for the
reduction in profits suffered by the claimant in consequence of California's environmentally motivated ban on the sale of the claimant's product.
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strides in recent years toward making their investment treaties more sensitive to the concerns of non-investors. 21
These and other countervailing developments are important. As I argue
in Part III of this Article, some of them may well hold the key to redressing many of the regime's most pressing problems. But in order to understand the origins of international investment law's particular public/private
dilemmas, it is necessary to focus on the aspects of the system that have
generated a public backlash rather than on those that have not. With this
in mind, I now turn to consider why the regime's potential public impact
has recently become the subject of concerted scholarly, civil societal, and
governmental debate.
A. UnanidatedEvolutionary Twists and Turns
The historical answer is that nobody saw it coming. When the contemporary international investment law regime was established in the midtwentieth century, the regime's founders expected it to serve a very basic
function: to protect the investments of developed country nationals
against opportunistic expropriations carried out by transitioning, postcolonial developing country governments. 22 The idea was that by providing
privately actionable protections to foreign investors, backed by a neutral
international dispute settlement system, states could encourage the private
sector to invest in developing countries, thereby stimulating economic
growth to the benefit of all. 23 This is not exactly how things have played
out in practice.
21. See, e.g., U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY pmbl., art. 29, art 4(b) at ann. B
(2012) [hereinafter U.S. MODEL BIT 2012] (Preamble specifying that investment protection should
be achieved "in a manner consistent with the protection of health, safety, and the environment, and
the promotion of internationally recognized labor rights"; art. 29 mandating the transparency of
arbitral proceedings; and art. 4(b) at Annex B stating, "Except in rare circumstances, nondiscriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public
welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect
expropriations.'), availabk at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT/20text%/20for/ 2OACIE
P%20Meeting.pdf.
22. The regime's historical roots stretch back to at least the late 1600s, with some of its basic legal
principles finding early articulations in the Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation treaties of the
European colonial powers and in judicial and arbitral pronouncements concerning the customary
practices observed by those powers over the course of the 18th, 19th, and early 20th centuries (such
practices having at various points been deemed to form part of the "law of nations'). Notwithstanding this long history, most commentators place the birthdate of the contemporary system in its present form either in 1959 (the year of the adoption of the first modem bilateral investment treaty
(BIT), concluded between Germany and Pakistan) or 1965 (the year in which the ICSID Convention,
supra note 2, was opened for signature).
23. ICSID Convention, supra note 2, pmbl.; see also INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON THE CONVENTION ON
THE SETILEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER
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At the time of the establishment of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), most investor-state disputes
were based upon individually negotiated investor-state contracts. They
tended to proceed as ordinary breach of contract claims, resolved by ordinary international commercial arbitration. ICSID registered twenty-six cases of this kind between 1965 and 1990,24 none of which produced any
notable public outcry.
But the fall of the Berlin Wall brought about a sea change for the regime. With the simultaneous opening up of so many markets in Eastern
Europe, a sort of gold rush ensued. Multinational companies from developed countries raced to seize upon new investment opportunities in previously closed economies. In these circumstances, taking the time to negotiate an investment contract with each host state's government - even assuming a company with sufficient market power to do so - could mean
losing out to nimbler competitors. Bilateral investment treaties (BITs)
granting generalized protections to broad classes of foreign investors
stepped in to fill this gap. 25 Between 1990 and 2012, the number of international treaties protecting foreign investors and their investments abroad
rose from 38526 to nearly 3200.27
These fast-paced legal developments were soon followed by another
profound shift in the global economy. Important developing and transitioning economies that were once viewed as likely recipients of capital
(traditional "host states") began transforming into major originators of
investment. By 2012, their share of global foreign direct investment (FDI)

STATES, 9 (Mar. 18, 1965), in ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND RULES, ICSID Doc.
ICSID/15,4 I.L.M. 524 (2006) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS].
24. THE ICSID CASELOAD - STATISTICS, Issue 2012-2, at 7 chart 1 (showing the total number
of ICSID cases registered by calendar year), available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontSer
vlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&CaseLoadStatistics=True&language
=English32 [hereinafter ICSID CASELOAD].
25. Thanks to effective industry lobbying in the 1980s, the United States, United Kingdom, and
several continental European countries had model BITs on-hand ready to do the job.
26. Press Release, UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Bilateral Investment
Treaties Quintupled During the 1990s, TAD/INF/2877 (Dec. 15, 2000).
27. Of which 2857 are bilateral investment treaties and 339 are "other IIAs," such as regional
trade agreements with investment chapters. See UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2013:
GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS, INVESTMENT AND TRADE FOR DEVELOPMENT, at 101, U.N. Doc. No.

UNCTAD/WIR/2014, U.N. Sales No. E.13.I1.D.5 (2013), available at http://unctad.org/en/pages/
PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=588 [hereinafter WIR 2013]. The most persuasive account
of the diffusion of BITs that I have seen to date can be found in Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen &
Emma Aisbett, When the C/aim Hits: Bilateral Investment Teaties and Bounded Rational Learming, 65
WORLD POL. 273 (2013).
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outflows had reached thirty-five percent, 28 with $168 billion in outbound
investment coming from China and Hong Kong alone. 29
All of these evolutions combined to create the perfect storm for international investment law. They catapulted the regime almost overnight to a
level of legal significance never fully anticipated by many of its principal
architects and state participants. 30 Developed countries that had aggressively promoted sweeping investor protections in international investment
treaties began finding themselves on the receiving end of the investor-state
arbitration stick. In the first two decades of operation of the North American Free Trade Agreement, for example, Canada and the United States
have each faced more investor-state arbitration claims than Mexico. 3'
The pace of legal claims has also accelerated exponentially. Of the 514
reported investment treaty arbitrations initiated by foreign investors
against states to date,32 more than ninety percent have been brought in the
past twelve years. 33 An increasing number of these claims brought by foreign investors now challenge the application of general regulatory
measures long thought to fall within the legitimate and non-reviewable
police powers of sovereign states. Recent targets of investor ire have included environmental regulations, affirmative action measures, cultural
protection laws, energy policies, and regulatory responses to economic crises. 34 And while it remains difficult for companies to obtain compensation
for profit-reducing state regulatory actions in most domestic legal systems,
empirical research shows that claimants win investor-state arbitration proceedings around fifty percent of the time.35

28. WIR 2013, supra note 27, at 4.
29. Id. at 6 fig. 1.6. For an analysis of China's evolving investment treaty program, see Stephan W.
Schill, Tearing Down the Great Wall The New Generation Investment Treaies of the People's Republic of China,
15 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 73 (2007).
30. The original expectations appear to have been that the regime would promote the flow of
foreign direct investment to developing countries and that it would de-politicize the settlement of
investment disputes by removing them from the realm of diplomatic protection. See REPORT OF THE
EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS, supra note 23, 9-10; Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoiticigadon
ofInvestment Disputes: The Roles ofICSID andMIGA, 1 ICSID REV. 1 (1986).
31. See Pleadings, Orders & Awards, NAFTA CLAIMS, http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes.htm
(last visited Mar. 11, 2014).
32. WIR 2013, supra note 27, at 110.
33. Id. at 102 fig. 111.3 (showing 514 arbitrations filed as of the end of 2010, with fewer than fifty
filed prior to 2000).
34. An overview of some controversial cases from the first decade of the twenty-first century is
provided in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (IISD), INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: KEY CASES FROM 2000-2010

(Nathalie Bemasconi-Osterwalder & Lise Johnson eds., 2011), available at http://www.tisd.org/pdf/
2011/int investment law and sd-key-cases_2010.pdf.
35. Susan D. Franck, Empiricaly Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L.
REV. 1 (2007).
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Not surprisingly, these next-generation disputes, unlike their humdrum
contract-based predecessors, have attracted significant public attention.
Domestic and transnational constituencies who stand to benefit from governmental regulatory measures - including organized labor, environmental lobbies, and human rights advocates - now routinely decry the international investment law regime as undemocratic, imbalanced, and biased in
favor of foreign investors over other important social groups. 36 They have
begun mobilizing against the regime in sophisticated ways. Prominent nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) founded in the mid-1990s out of
concern that the World Trade Organization (WTO) would negatively impact upon public interest issues are now devoting sizeable portions of
their budgets to lobbying for reforms to the international investment law
regime instead.37
Against this whirlwind backdrop, it is no surprise that practitioners, arbitrators, scholars, and others have only recently begun debating the appropriate role of international investment law in protecting "public" versus "private" rights and interests within the global economy.38 Much of the
scholarly discourse characterizes the debate itself as a "backlash" against
international investment law.39 Some observers wonder whether the mod-

36. See, e.g., HOWARD MANN, IISD, PRIVATE RIGHTS, PUBLIC PROBLEMS: A GUIDE TO
NAFTA's CONTROVERSIAL CHAPTER ON INVESTOR RIGHTS (2001); Press Release, Seattle to Brus-

sels Network, Member States Put Corporate Rights over Public Interests in EU Investment Policy
(Oct. 25, 2010), available at http://www.s2bnetwork.org/fileadmin/dateien/downloads/S2B-press
releaseCouncilconclusions_101025.pdf; SARAH ANDERSON & SARA GRUSKY, FOOD & WATER
WATCH & INST. FOR POL'Y STUD., CHALLENGING CORPORATE INVESTOR RULE: HOW THE
WORLD BANK'S INVESTMENT COURT, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS, AND BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES HAVE UNLEASHED A NEW ERA OF CORPORATE POWER AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT
(2007), availabk at http://www.ips-dc.org/reports/070430-challengingcorporateinvestorrule.pdf;
Scott Sinclair, The Investment Chapter in the Canada-ColombiaFTA, in CAN. COUNCIL FOR INT'L COOPERATION, MAKING A BAD SITUATION WORSE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE TEXT OF THE CANADACOLOMBIA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 16 (2009), available at http://www.ccic.ca/_files/en/makinga bad situation worsejlong-version.pdf.
3. See, e.g., IISD, http://www.iisd.org (last visited Mar. 11, 2014) (the contemporary work programs of the International Institute for Sustainable Development); CTR. FOR INT'L ENVTL. L.,
http://www.ciel.org (last visited Mar. 11, 2014) (which have been two of the most active NGOs in
investment arbitration debates).
38. Amanda L. Norris & Katina E. Metzidakis, Pubc Protests, Private Contracts: Confdentiafity in
ICSID Arbitration and the Cochabamba Water War, 15 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 31 (2010); Barnali
Choudhury, Recapturing Publc Power- Is Investment Arbitration'sEngagement ofthe Publc Interest Contributing
to the Democratic Dficit?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 775 (2008); Noemi Gal-Or, Dispute Resolution in
InternationalTrade and Investment Law: Privatisation of the Pubc?, in TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE GOVERNANCE AND ITS LIMITS 209 (Jean-Christophe Graz & Andreas N6lke eds., 2008); William W.
Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Pubic Law Sphere: The Standard of Review in
Investor-StateArbitrations,35 YALEJ. INT'L L. 283 (2010).
39. THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010).
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ern system of international investment law is on the verge of collapse.40
Others actively call for the system's abolition.4 1 Still others prefer to view
recent developments as growing pains - a temporary "legitimacy crisis"
engendered by the novelty, but not necessarily undesirability, of arbitrating

public interest issues within a private dispute settlement framework. 42 Reasonable minds may well disagree, it seems. More to the point, we should
expect them do so when they have only recently begun working through a
largely unexpected set of problems.
B. StructuralPeculiarities
If historical happenstance helps explain why scholarly consideration of
the regime is still in its early stages, international investment law's structural
peculiarities may explain why the nascent debate has so far centered on
trying to pin down the system's public versus private nature. Several commentators have examined the regime's unusual structural features at
length.43 I survey them only briefly here, focusing specifically on four features that seem to underpin the belief that international investment law
sets up a novel kind of tension between public and private rights not otherwise seen in other areas of international law.
1. The Sweeping Global Coverage of Investment Instruments
Numerous international legal regimes are global in scope. The investment law regime is unusual, however, in that its coverage is technically
patchy but functionally sweeping. This is because international investment
law encompasses a vast number of interwoven legal instruments protect40. Christoph Schreuer, KeynoteAddress: The Dynamic Evolution of the ICSID System, in THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES (ICSID): TAKING

STOCK AFTER 40 YEARS 15, 31 (Rainer Hofmann & Christian J. Tams eds., 2007), availabk at
http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/pdf/cspubl_86.pdf ("So is investor-state arbitration in danger? The
answer is probably: not yet but we should not necessarily take it for granted. There may well be further curtailments or even calls to replace the current system by a State v. State system.'.
41. See Public Statement by Osgoode Hall Law School on the International Investment Regime
18 (Aug. 31, 2010), http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public statement/. In this public statement, fifty
academics expressed that "[t]here is a strong moral as well as policy case for governments to withdraw from investment treaties and to oppose investor-state arbitration." Id.
42. Ari Afilalo, Towards a Common Law of IntemationalInvestment: How NAFTA Chapter 11 Panels
Should Solve Their Legitimay Crisis, 17 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 51 (2004); Charles N. Brower, A
Crisis of lzgiimag, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 7, 2002, at 1; Susan D. Franck, The egitimay Crisis in Investment
Treaty Arbitration:PrivatijngPublic InternationalLaw Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.
1521 (2005). I note that the "legitimacy crisis" discussion is not unique to international investment
law. See, e.g., A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY: TRANSNATIONAL
MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (2003) (arguing that the reconfiguration of

authority in the global political economy portends a "crisis of legitimacy" for international law more
broadly).
43. See espedal# VAN HARTEN, supra note 11; SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 11.
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ing foreign investors and their investments. These come in three basic
types: international investment treaties, investor-state contracts, and domestic investment statutes. Foreign investors can benefit from multiple
types of protection simultaneously, and where one type of protection is
unavailable, a diligent investor can usually find a way to obtain one or more
of the other types. For example, an investor who wishes to invest in a
country with which its home country does not maintain an investment
treaty may route its investment through a third country. This is why Philip
Morris, a U.S. incorporated company, brought its dispute against Australia
through its Hong Kong subsidiary (thereby taking advantage of the Australia-Hong Kong BIT.)44 With more than 3000 bilateral and regional investment treaties now in existence,45 it is often possible to structure investments in such a way as to bring them within the ambit of at least one
investment treaty. The inclusion of most-favored nation clauses in most
treaties then enables investors to claim the benefit of the highest level of
protection offered by a state under any of its other treaties.
Even in the case of the few countries that remain outside the investment treaty system (most notably Brazil), an investor with sufficient market clout can often persuade the host state to agree to an investor-state
contract offering similar protections. 46 The upshot of all of this is that,
although 100 years' worth of efforts by treaty negotiators have failed to
generate a multilateral agreement on investment, 47 international investment
law has nevertheless effectively gone global.48 This makes the regime's actual or potential impact upon public policy and the public interest a matter
of global significance.
2. The Broad andEvolving Notion of 'qnvestment"
Most international legal instruments exposing states to direct financial
liability are narrowly drafted. For example, there are thousands of pages of
44. In Philip Morris's case, this routing may have been done too late, which could cause problems for the company's claim at the jurisdictional phase. But when done prior to the onset of any
dispute, "treaty shopping" is generally accepted by arbitral tribunals as a valid form of investment
planning.
45. WIR 2013, supra note 27, at 101.
46. Because most contract-based disputes remain confidential, it is impossible to know whether
the outcomes of contract-based disputes differ substantially from treaty-based disputes arising out of
the same sets of facts and circumstances. For a conceptual discussion of the potential parallels between the two types of disputes, see infra notes 169-171 and accompanying text. For a sociological
account of the international commercial arbitration world, see YVES DEZAIAY & BRYANT G.
GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1996).
47. For a catalog of the multiple failed attempts, see VAN HARTEN, supra note 11, at 18-23.

48. See generaly STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAw (2009).
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WTO country schedules listing the specific tariff lines in respect of which
countries have agreed to be bound. Not so with most existing investment
treaties. The majority of contemporary investment treaties protect, as illustrated by the 2012 U.S. Model BIT, "every asset that an investor owns or
controls, directly or indirectly."49 This includes, in particular, but not exclusively: stocks, bonds, debentures, claims to money, tangible and intangible
property, intellectual property, contract rights, and more.5 0 The standard
definition is broad enough to encompass not only so-called "greenfield"
investments but also cross-border mergers and acquisitions and, unless
explicitly excluded, portfolio investments. 51
When combined with the fact that most investment treaties protect
both natural and juridical persons as investors, this can lead to some surprising results: host state nationals can sometimes bring international arbitration claims against their own governments simply by incorporating a
shell company abroad;52 shareholders who would have no derivative cause
of action under domestic law can claim compensation from the state under international law for a drop in share value brought about by a generally
applicable regulatory measure; 53 foreign investments can benefit from
broad international legal protections irrespective of whether they contribute anything of lasting value to the host state or its economy;54 and now,
after a 2011 jurisdictional decision that went against Argentina,55 foreign
49. U.S. MODEL BIT 2012, supra note 21, art. 1.
50. Id. art. 1(a)-(h).
51. Both majority and minority shareholdings have been found to fall within the scope of investment treaty protections, even where the investor does not hold significant voting or control
rights.
52. See, e.g.,Tokios Tokel6s v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction,
I 1-4, 14-71 (Apr. 29, 2004) (finding that a Lithuanian company could bring treaty claims against
Ukraine, despite the fact that the company was incorporated by Ukrainian nationals using funds
imported from Ukraine to Lithuania). But see Tokios Tokel6s v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/18, Dissenting Opinion (Apr. 29, 2004) (Prosper Weil, dissenting) (reaching opposite conclusion); TSA Spectrum de Argentina S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/5,
Award (Dec. 19, 2008) (departing from the Tokios Tokeks approach, though the dissenting arbitrator
embraced it). Some treaties, like the Energy Charter Treaty, contain provisions that prohibit domestic
investors from doing this kind of end-run around their own domestic court systems, but many other
treaties do not.
53. Argentina has raised this point as a jurisdictional objection in two-dozen of the claims arising
out of its 2001 financial crisis. It has lost the objection each time. See Daimler Fin. Servs. AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Award, 1 91 (Aug. 22, 2012), availabk athttp://italaw.
com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ital082.pdf.
54. The Sakni tribunal famously read an "economic contribution" requirement into the ICSID
Convention, but the validity of this move has been disputed, and many tribunals have declined to
follow suit. See Salini Costruttori S.P.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, 52 (July 23, 2001), 42 ILM 609 (2003).
55. Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility (Aug. 4, 2011), available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestTy
pe=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC3130_En&caseld=C95.
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speculators in sovereign bond markets may enjoy special guarantees against
sovereign default while domestic bondholders (and non-covered foreign
bondholders) must accept "haircuts" in the form of debt restructuring
deals.
From a business perspective, it makes perfect sense to treat all forms of
business participation the same. All are essentially profit-seeking activities,
and the decision to pursue one over the others is often made for pragmatic
reasons. But if investments need not be truly foreign, nor direct, nor even
"investments" in the classical sense of these words5 6 in order to qualify for
special protections under contemporary investment treaties, then it becomes difficult to justify the regime under the traditional explanation that
it promotes the economic development of host states by encouraging foreign direct investment inflows. This difficulty is compounded by the fact
that the empirical literature is beginning to make the investment treaty bargain, in particular, look rather one-sided. Empiricists have so far found
little evidence to suggest that investment treaties increase investment flows
to the countries that sign them, nor that they reduce political risk insurance
premiums for investors. 57 By contrast, there is ample evidence - in the
form of numerous damages awards - that the treaties can impose significant costs on host states. 58 This empirical lopsidedness supplies yet another reason for the growing perception that international investment law
privileges "private" investor rights over all other "public" interests. 59
3. Vague Treaty Standardsand the Elision of Rights and Interests
A third reason for the perceived imbalance between private and public
rights is that states' legal obligations toward foreign investors under international investment treaties are notoriously vague. They are drafted in the
form of broad standards rather than precise obligations. While there are
minor differences in wording across treaties, most of them obligate states
56. Some investments, like sovereign bonds, may be of an entirely speculative nature, capable of
being bought and then sold on an international exchange within a span of minutes.
57. See Jason Webb Yackee, Do BilateralInvestment Treates Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some
HintsfromAlternaiveEvidence, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 397, 426-31 (2011) (summarizing the existing empirical literature, which shows investment treaties do not produce increases in investment inflows, and
finding additionally that investment treaties do not seem to factor into the decision-making processes
of company executives when deciding whether to undertake foreign investments nor of risk insurers
when calculating premiums for political risk insurance policies).
58. Of course, there are just as many cases wherein investors receive no compensation. See
Franck, sKpra note 35, at 58. But this does not satisfy critics who would like to see a demonstrable
benefit to host states that is of a sufficient scale to offset the damages paid out in the fifty percent
(on average) of claims lost.
59. 1 discuss some possible alternative justifications for the regime. See infra Part U.C. Unfortunately, none of these has yet been empirically tested, and data limitations may well prevent their theoretical benefits from ever being conclusively demonstrated.
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to do six basic things: provide fair and equitable treatment, and full protection and security to the foreign investment; guarantee the free transferability of the investment and its associated returns; treat foreign investors at
least as favorably as the State's own investors (national treatment) and the
investors of any third state (most-favored nation treatment); and not to
expropriate the investment except for a public purpose, in accordance with
due process, and against prompt, adequate and effective compensation generally interpreted as requiring compensation at fair market value.
All of these obligations sound quite reasonable in the abstract. The difficulty lies in applying them consistently across diverse factual and legal
contexts. There are at least three components to the problem. First and
foremost is the ambiguity of the textual provisions themselves. What is an
expropriation, exactly? Does it cover only physical confiscations of property or also other types of measures having a confiscatory effect? Can a
substantial diminution in the value of a property brought about by a government regulatory measure amount to an indirect expropriation? 60 Can a
series of small measures, like progressive tax increases, add up to a "creeping expropriation?" 61 The fair and equitable treatment standard leaves even
more room for interpretation. What does it mean for a government action
to be fair and equitable? Fair to whom, and in what sense? Equitable in
relation to which standard of reference? Should one look to domestic law,
customary practice, the investor's subjective expectations, or the arbitrator's own personal sense of fairness? 62
This latter set of questions points to the second aspect of the vague
standards problem: they are interpreted on a case-by-case basis by arbitrators hailing from different backgrounds, each of whom at some level imbues the words of the treaty63 with meanings derived from his or her own
experience. 64 A U.S.-trained arbitrator may implicitly read ideas drawn from
the American regulatory takings jurisprudence into an expropriation analy60. In U.S. parlance this is known as a regulatory taking.
61. For a discussion of these questions, see RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAw 89-118 (2008).
62. The NAFTA member countries attempted, in 2001, to bring some clarity to NAFTA Chapter
1I's fair and equitable treatment standard by issuing an interpretive note specifying that this standard
was meant to reflect the minimum standard of treatment found in customary international law. See
NAFTA Free Trade Comm'n, Notes ofInterpretationofCertainNAPFA Chapter 11 Provisions, at § B (July
31, 2001), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/files/NAFTAComm_1105_Transparency.pdf.
The utility of this clarification remains disputed, however, since the content of the customary law
standard is itself a matter of longstanding debate. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 61, at 11932.
63. Or contract or statute, as the case may be.
64. This is not to suggest that arbitrators intentionally impart nationalistic interpretations upon
treaty provisions, only that it is human nature to make sense of new information by reference to an
existing knowledge base.
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sis, while a French arbitrator may read-in French and perhaps also European law understandings. 65 Small wonder, then, that the same treaty standards
are sometimes interpreted by different arbitral tribunals in diametrically
opposed ways. 66
Third, the textual ambiguities pose quandaries concerning the very nature of investment disciplines. Are investors rights-holders under investment treaties (since they can lodge claims against host states for violations
of treaty obligations)? Or are they mere third-party beneficiaries who hold
a derivative interest in states' observance of their reciprocal legal obligations (since the investors themselves are not parties to the treaty)?67
The treaty standards are so vague that it is difficult to distinguish between rights and interests. Perhaps this explains why arbitral tribunals have
tended to elide the two. The fair and equitable treatment standard, for example, has been interpreted as requiring states to protect the legitimate,
investment-backed expectations of investors concerning their investments. 68 Do investors then have a right to, or merely an interest in, the
protection of their legitimate expectations? Since the concrete components of vague treaty standards are articulated by arbitrators rather than by
treaty drafters, it seems strange to call those components "rights". But if
investors can obtain compensation when states act in ways that contravene
their expectations, then the academic distinction between rights and interests becomes moot in any event. The ambiguity of the legal obligations
creates an environment wherein investor perceptions seem to matter more
65. For an extensive discussion of the relationship between arbitrator appointment practices and
outcomes, as well as the impact of arbitrator characteristics upon decision-making trends, see Michael
Waibel & Yanhui Wu, Are Arbifrators Podlical?(ASI Res. Forum, Working Paper, 2011) (on file with
the Virginia Journal of International Law Association) (finding that investment arbitrators are more
lenient to host countries from their own legal family, and that other aspects of arbitrator experience
and training also play an important role in investment arbitration decisions, even after controlling for
industry fixed effects and country characteristics).
66. Susan Franck refers to this as "privatizing public intemational law through inconsistent decisions." Franck, supra note 42, at 1. For an analysis of inconsistent interpretations of most-favored
nation clauses, see Julie A. Maupin, MFN-BasedJuridcdionin Investor-StateArbitration:Is There Any Hope
for a ConsistntApproach?,14J. INT'L ECON. L. 157 (2011).
67. For a discussion of this debate, see Anthea Roberts, Power andPersuasionin Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dua/Role ofStates, 104 AM.J. INT'L L. 179, 184-85 (2010).
68. See Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, IN 152-74 (May 29, 2003), 19 ICSID Rev. 158 (2004) (discussing fair and
equitable treatment and legitimate expectations). Numerous subsequent tribunals have adopted the
same approach. For criticism of this approach, see Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona
S.A., v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability (July 30, 2010),
available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0826.pdf; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., v. Argentine Republic, ARB/03/17, Separate Opinion of Arbitrator
Pedro Nikken, T 2-3, 22-27 (July 30, 2010), available at http://italawcom/documents/SueVivendi
AWGSeparateOpinion.pdf (objecting to what he regards as the arbitral invention of the legitimate
expectations and stability and predictability doctrines within fair and equitable treatment analysis).
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than legal doctrine. 69 This again fuels the concern that the regime favors
private investor rights over competing public interest concerns.
4. Extra-DemocraticDispute Settlement
Where the rubber really hits the road, however, in terms of the investment regime's public versus private debate, is in its peculiar brand of investor-state dispute settlement. After all, legal challenges to governmental
regulatory activities are hardly a new phenomenon. What makes them
novel in the international investment law context is the fact that they are
decided entirely outside of the constitutional framework of the state engaging in the regulation. The individuals who decide investor-state disputes
are private arbitrators who - for reasons having to do with the perception
of neutrality - do not hail from the state concerned. They are not subject
to any kind of domestic democratic control. They are, by design, strangers
to the legal, political, social, and cultural traditions of the state whose actions they are evaluating.
In most cases, two of the three arbitrators are appointed by the disputing parties themselves - one by the investor and one by the respondent
state. The presiding arbitrator is then appointed either by agreement of the
parties or their appointed arbitrators, or, more commonly, by a designated
institutional appointing authority from one of the major arbitration institutions.70 This arrangement leads to predictably strategic appointment behaviors. The investor-claimant appoints an arbitrator either believed to be
generally pro-investor or known to favor the arguments the investor intends to bring in the particular dispute. The respondent state does likewise,
appointing the arbitrator it believes most likely to absolve it of any financial liability. And while party-appointed arbitrators do not always fulfill the
expectations of their appointing parties, they appear to do so with sufficient frequency as to fuel concerns that the system is biased by design.71
69. For an arbitral refutation of the tendency to accept investor perceptions as law, see Daimler
Fin. Servs. AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Award, 246 (Aug. 22, 2012),
availableat http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ital082.pdf.
70. The arbitration-related institutions that play the biggest role in investor-state disputes include
ICSID, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC),
the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
(SCQ, and UNCITRAL. The first five all offer institutional administration of investor-state disputes,
while the last is an inter-governmental body that promulgates a set of procedural rules (commonly
referred to as the UNICTRAL arbitration rules) that are used in most "ad hoc" (meaning not institutionally administered) investor-state arbitrations.
71. Albert Jan van den Berg, Dissenting Opinions by Paqy-AppointedArbitrators in Investment Arbitration, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL
REISMAN 821, 826-827 (Mahnoush H. Arsanjani et al. eds., 2011) (finding that dissenting opinions
almost always favor the party who appointed the dissenter). See also the collected papers in
TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT.: ARBITRATOR BIAS (SPECIAL), July 2008 (Sophie Nappert ed.), http://
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Some critics contend that a systemic bias extends to presiding arbitrators as well - the crucial swing vote in many cases. The argument is that,
because all three arbitrators are paid by the disputing parties, and only investors (not states) can initiate arbitration proceedings, presiding arbitrators who wish to safeguard the possibility of future investor-state arbitration appointments have an incentive to ensure that investors win with
some frequency. 72 I have reservations as to the accuracy of such incentive
arguments. 73 Nevertheless, when one adds to the suggestion of biased decision-making the facts that: (1) investor-state disputes may impact upon
matters of concern to persons who are not before the tribunal, (2) the decisions of investment arbitrators are generally not reviewable in domestic
courts, 74 and (3) the monetary awards issued by investor-state tribunals are
often directly enforceable through the attachment of state-owned resources in dozens of countries around the world,7 5 it becomes easy to see
why the regime is described as suffering from a legitimacy crisis. 76
What is not so obvious, however, is how conceiving of the regime as either a transnational public regulatory system or, alternatively, a private dispute settlement system does anything to resolve the crisis. But before turning to this quandary, it is necessary to fill in one more missing piece of the
puzzle. What kinds of public/private dilemmas have actually arisen in investor-state disputes, and why should we care about them? The next section answers these questions by reference to three specific case studies.

www.transnational-dispute-management.com/artide.asp?key= 1249.
72. For an argument along these lines, see Gus Van Harten, PerreivedBias in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 433
(Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010).
73. I find the arbitrator self-interest argument deficient on at least two fronts. First, to the extent
that party-appointed arbitrators tend to find in favor of their appointing parties, it seems more likely
that this may happen because the appointing parties did a good job of vetting the arbitrators' proclivities in advance (viewpoint bias) rather than because arbitrators are strategically angling to procure
a stream of future appointments (incentive bias). Second, the self-interest argument is rather complicated as applied to presiding arbitrators. Even assuming such arbitrators wish to maximize their own
personal reappointment prospects, it is not clear that this would be accomplished by favoring claimants over states, since the overall survival of the regime depends upon continued state support. In a
more recent article, Van Harten has backed away from the more generalized bias argument, instead
suggesting that there is some tentative empirical evidence of a systemic bias in favor of "claimants in
general and claimants from major Western capital-exporting states in particular." Gus Van Harten,
ArbitratorBehaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudicaion: An EmpiicalStudy of Investment Treaty Arbitraion, 50
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 211, 216 (2012). To my knowledge, this more limited claim has not yet been
either replicated or refuted.
74. Except on the very limited grounds set out under article 52 of the ICSID Convention, supra
note 2, or in some cases under article V of the New York Convention, supra note 2.
75. Sovereign immunity doctrines render some assets easier to attach than others.
76. See sources cited supra note 42.
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C. What's Really At Stake? Three Examples of Public/PrivateClashes
1. A Private Concession in Public InfrastructureServices: Suez et al. v.
Argentina7 7
In 1993, Argentina privatized the water distribution and wastewater
treatment services for the city of Buenos Aires, an area comprising some
eight million inhabitants. A consortium of European companies (the investors/claimants) bid upon and won the thirty-year concession contract.
Unfortunately, by 2000, Argentina began to experience serious financial
difficulties. Faced with massive strikes, riots, runs on the banks, and the
ouster of five presidents in ten days, Argentina abandoned the dollar-peso
convertibility law, which had been the primary guarantor of the concession's profitability. The concession contract entitled the investors to pass
the resulting seventy-percent depreciation of the peso along to Buenos
Aires' water consumers. As this would have tripled the price of water and
rendered it unaffordable to large swaths of the population in the midst of
an economic crisis, the Argentine government froze the tariffs of all public
service utilities and announced the mandatory renegotiation of the concessions.
Dissatisfied with the progress of the renegotiation efforts, the European investors filed an investor-state arbitration claim against Argentina under that country's bilateral investment treaties with Spain, France, and the
United Kingdom. The investors claimed that Argentina had, by its emergency measures, expropriated their investment, subjected them to unfair

and inequitable treatment, and failed to provide them with full protection
and security as required under the treaties. They sought compensation for
the full market value of the investment as it stood prior to Argentina's abrogation of the dollar-peso convertibility law, to include twenty-three
years' worth of lost profits calculated at the investment's pre-crisis profita-

bility level.
Argentina defended the suit on the grounds that it had acted out of
economic necessity and a duty to protect its population and that it had no
reasonable alternative under the circumstances. Several human rights organizations and consumer advocacy groups filed a joint amicus brief urg-

ing the tribunal to take into account Argentina's international legal obligations -

under several human rights treaties -

to ensure uninterrupted

77. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/19, and AWG Group Ltd. v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on Liability (July
30, 2010), available at http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:iic/443-2010.case.1 /IIC443(2010)
D.pdf; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.

ARB/03/19, and AWG Group Ltd. v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, Procedural Order No. 2
(Aug. 3, 2006), available at http://italaw.com/documents/SuezVivendiAVGPONo.2.pdf.

388

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw

[Vol. 54:2

access to safe drinking water. The majority of the tribunal paid no heed to
either set of public-regarding arguments, however. In an award on liability
issued in 2010, the majority of the arbitral tribunal found that Argentina
had violated the treaties' fair and equitable treatment standard by frustrating the investors' legitimate expectations concerning the investment. It did
not find the health or human rights implications of allowing the investors
to implement the contractually permitted three-fold price hike in the midst
of an economic crisis to be relevant to its decision. The tribunal's determination on damages is still pending, though it is expected to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars.7 8
The Suet dispute exhibits several features that are typical of many modern-day, investor-state arbitration claims. A large number of foreign direct
investments are made in sectors that provide essential services to the general public. According to figures from the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes: six percent of all registered ICSID disputes
have involved water, sanitation, or flood protection; thirteen percent electric power and energy; eleven percent transportation; five percent agriculture, fishing, and forestry; and twenty-five percent oil, gas, and mining.79
2. Private Financingof PublicDebt: Abaclat v. Argentinaso
Public interest in international investment disputes is not always confined to specific public-service industries or natural resource sectors.
Sometimes the public dimensions of disputes are more general in nature.
The ongoing Abaclat matter, another of the many claims to arise out of
the Argentine financial crisis, illustrates this point nicely. Abaclat concerns
the rescheduling of sovereign debt. After Argentina defaulted on some
$100 billion in external debt in December of 2001, eight major Italian
banks formed an association to "represent the interests of the Italian
bondholders in pursuing a negotiated settlement with Argentina." 81 This
association declined to participate in the debt restructuring deal that was
78. The size of the investors' claim is not yet a matter of public record. But seeAzurix Corp. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, 1442 (uly 14, 2006), 43 IM 262 (2004)
available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/CSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=sho
wDoc&docId=DC507_En&caseld=C5 (awarding investors in a similar water concession located in a
smaller province damages in the amount of $165.2 million plus interest); CMS Gas Transmission Co.
v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, %f2, 139 (May 12, 2005), 44 Illf 1205
(2005) (awarding investors in a gas distribution concession damages of $133.2 million plus interest).
79. ICSID CASELOAD, supra note 24, at 12. Mining is obviously not a direct public service industry, but oil and gas often are, and the ICSID statistics unfortunately do not separate the three.
80. Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on jurisdiction and
Admissibility (Aug. 4, 2011), available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestTy
pe=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC3130_En&caseld=C95.
81. Id 166.
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offered by Argentina and accepted by the majority of its creditors in 2005.
Instead, it launched the first ever mass, investor-state arbitration claim.
The claim was brought by the Italian association under the Italy-Argentina
bilateral investment treaty on behalf of 180,000 Italian holders of defunct
Argentine bonds.
Argentina strongly objected to the registration of the dispute, arguing
that sovereign bonds sold on international exchanges are not foreign direct
investments for purposes of the ICSID Convention and that the Argentina-Italy bilateral investment treaty did not contemplate the possibility of
mass arbitration claims. Two-thirds of the initial claimants withdrew or
settled their claims during the jurisdictional tug-of-war that ensued. But in
August of 2011, a majority of the arbitral tribunal held that it had jurisdiction to entertain the mass action by the remaining 60,000 claimants and
that it would proceed to hear the merits of the dispute. 82
The timing of the decision could not have been more momentous.
With the Eurozone in full crisis-management mode and the Greek debt
restructuring process already underway, disgruntled investors the world
over began to consider whether it might be possible to bring similar mass
claims against Greece83 and perhaps - in the event of an eventual default - against Portugal, Spain, and Italy as well.
It remains to be seen what will happen with the Abaclat claim on the
merits. Even so, the mere possibility that foreign bondholders might be
able to sue for the full par value of defunct sovereign bonds in an investorstate arbitration setting raises important public policy questions. Will allowing such claims encourage holdouts and make future sovereign debt
restructurings impossible? If so, what options will be left to heavily indebted countries seeking to recover from crisis episodes? And if national
governments can be sued for sovereign default, why not sub-national governmental units, like states and municipalities? International investment
agreements typically hold national governments financially liable for any
violations committed by their constituent sub-entities. 84 This is notewor82. Arbitrator Georges Abi-Saab, a prominent public international lawyer and former member of
the World Trade Organization Appellate Body, wrote a scathing 105-page dissent and then resigned
from the tribunal in protest of the majority's decision. See Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Oct. 28, 2011) (George Abi-Saab, Arb.,
dissenting), available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0237.pdf.
83. Kyriaki Karadelis, Greece: A New Argentina?, GLOBAL ARB. REV., June 12, 2012, at 11 (noting
at least one German law firm had announced plans to bring a treaty claim against Greece on behalf
of some German holders of restructured Greek bonds); Bondholders' ClaimAgainst Greece is Registeredat
ICSID, as MandatoU Wait-PeriodExpires on Another ThreatenedArbitration,INVESTMENT ARB. REP., May
30, 2013, at 19 (reporting on one filed and one potential claim against Greece).
84. See, e.g., U.S. MODEL BIT 2012, supra note 21, art. 2(b) (specifying that the state's obligation to
protect investors and their investments applies "to the political subdivisions of that Party'). Such
commitments are common in investment treaties. Even if they were not, article 27 of the Vienna
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thy, since there is increasing evidence that many sub-federal U.S. entities in
particular may be carrying large and unsustainable debt burdens. 85
What the Abaclat case makes clear, therefore, is that international investment law may have important implications for how governments go
about raising funds and dealing with liquidity crunches. Here, it is not
simply the public impact of a foreign investment in a particular public service industry that is at issue. It is the government fisc as a whole that is
affected.
3. Private Propertyin Public Health Ha.Zards:Philip Morris v. Australia

86

Philip Morris's pending claim against Australia underscores that financially volatile developing country governments are by no means the only
ones to face investor-state claims whose ramifications can extend beyond
the disputing parties themselves. In November of 2011, the Australian
parliament approved the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act. The Act attempts
to "reduc[e] the attractiveness and appeal of tobacco products to consumers" 87 by "prohibit[ing] the use of trade marks, symbols, graphics or images on or in relation to tobacco products and packaging . . . ."88 Philip Morris responded to the new Australian legislation by filing an investment treaty claim against Australia through its subsidiary, Philip Morris Asia Limited, a Hong Kong company.89 It brought the claim under the bilateral investment treaty between Australia and Hong Kong.
Convention on the Law of Treaties prohibits a state from "invok[ing] the provisions of its internal
law [including constitutional federalism provisions] as justification for its failure to perform a treaty."
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter
Vienna Convention].
85. See State and MuniapalDebt: The Coming Criisd: Hearing Befor the Subcomm. on TARP, Fin. Sers.,
& Bailouts of Pub. & Private Programs of the H. Comm. on Overight & Gov't Reform, 112th Cong. 16-18
(2011) (statement of Nicole Gelinas, Searle Freedom Trust Fellow, Manhattan Institute), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg68362/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg68362.pdf. For examples of proposed solutions to the state problem that could be thwarted in the event of an investment
treaty claim, see Steven L. Schwarcz, A Minimalst Approach to State 'Bankrupty," 59 UCLA L. REV.
322 (2011); see also George Triantis, Bankrupty For the States and by the States, in WHEN STATES Go
BROKE: THE ORIGINS, CONTEXT, AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN STATES IN FISCAL CRISIS

237 (Peter Conti-Brown & David A. Skeel, Jr. eds., 2012).
86. See Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, Notice of Arbitration (Nov. 21, 2011), availableat http://www.ag.gov.au/Intemationalrelations/InternationalLaw/Do
cuments/Philip%20Morris%20Asia%2OLimited%2ONotice%20of/o20Arbitration%2021%2ONovem
ber0/20201 I.pdf; qf Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, Australia's
Response to the Notice of Arbitration (Dec. 21, 2011).
87. Phil# Morris Asia Lid., UNCITRAL, Australia's Response to the Notice of Arbitration, 25
(quoting a submission of the World Health Organization) (internal citations omitted).
88. Phih MorrisAsia lid, UNCITRAL, Notice of Arbitration, 4.12.
89. The claim was brought under the Agreement Between the Government of Hong Kong and
the Government of Australia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Sept. 15, 1993, 1770
U.N.T.S. 385 and is proceeding under the 2010 UNCITRAL arbitration rules.
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In its notice of arbitration, Philip Morris has alleged that Australia's
prohibition on the display of tobacco-related trademarks has expropriated
the value of its shares by "destroy[ing] the commercial value of the [company's] intellectual property and goodwill" 90 and "undermin[ing] the economic rationale of the investments . . . ."91 It further claims that the Act
violates the treaty's fair and equitable treatment guarantee by frustrating
the company's legitimate interests and expectations concerning the profitability of its investment. By way of remedy, the company asks the arbitral
tribunal to order Australia to suspend the enforcement of the plain packaging legislation 92 or, in the alternative, to pay Philip Morris compensatory
damages for the lost value of its investment "in an amount to be quantified but of the order of billions of Australian dollars."93 Uruguay is facing
a similar claim by Philip Morris,94 and the company has threatened parallel
suits against other countries that are debating the merits of plain packaging legislation.
These cases test the degree to which international investment law may
limit the scope - or raise the price - of a sovereign's right to regulate in
the interests of the public. In civil society discourse, this question has become known as the regulatory chill problem.
The basic idea motivating this concern is straightforward. As scientific
research advances over time and social attitudes evolve, public policy must
adapt. This is as true of public health policy as it is of environmental
preservation, financial regulation, and just about every other conceivable
area of governmental regulation. Yet if investment treaties are interpreted
as requiring governments to pay compensation to foreign investors whenever general welfare-enhancing regulatory activities somehow reduce investor profits, then governments will be hesitant to regulate in the public interest. In some cases, where the price is too high and the government
budget too small, governments may even find themselves financially incapable of doing so.
Fears about regulatory chill are understandable in light of the fact that
investor-state disputes often involve high stakes.95 The Big Tobacco dis-

90. Phihi MorrisAsia Ltd., UNCITRAL, Notice of Arbitration

7.3(b).

91. Id. I 7.3.(a).

92. Id. 8.2.

93. Id. 8.3.
94. Philip Morris Brand Sarl (Switzerland) v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No.
ARB/10/7, Request for Arbitration (Feb. 19, 2010), available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/fi
les/case-documents/ita0343.pdf. The named companies are subsidiaries of Philip Morris Intemational, which has its operations center in Switzerland. Thus, the claim is proceeding under the
Agreement Between the Swiss Confederation and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Oct. 7, 1988, 1976 U.N.T.S. 414.
95. Susan D. Franck, The ICSID Effect? Considering Potential Vaiation in ArbitrationAwards, 51 VA.
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putes are multi-billion dollar claims, as is the recent claim by Swedish energy company Vattenfall against Germany.9 6 Of course, investors do not
always win these challenges, and even when they do, they rarely recover the
full amount of their claims.97 Still, the financial implications for states can
be significant. The Czech Republic lost an infamous dispute over media
licensing that resulted in it having to pay out $355 million to a foreign investor.98 This amounted to the equivalent of its national healthcare budget
for that year.99 Argentina has faced forty-one investor-state claims as a result of its 2001 financial crisis,100 the sum total of which at one point exceeded the country's gross domestic product. Greece and other struggling
Eurozone countries may soon find themselves in a similar position.1o' Returning to Philip Morris, the Marlboro brand alone has an estimated

worldwide value of $73.6 billion.10 2 This surpasses the annual GDP of all
but the top eighteen richest countries in the world.103
Does all of this mean that international investment law makes each
state's ability to regulate harmful activities a function of the state's overall
economic power relative to the strength of a given foreign investor's market power? If so, might large companies operating in small countries effectively enjoy an internationally protected right to pollute? To frack? To
strip-mine? To deforest? To sell hazardous consumer products?

J. INT'L. L.

825, 856 (2011) (reporting the mean amount claimed in ICSID cases to be $424,615,349
(USD) and in non-ICSID investor-state arbitration cases to be $169,463,547 (USD)).
96. Vattenfall Launches, supra note 5.
97. Franck, supra note 95, at 58-59. The largest known monetary award to date came to $1.77 billion (USD). UNCTAD, IIA Issues Note No. 1: Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement
(ISDS), at 1, UNCTAD Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2013/3/REV (May 2013), available at:
3
http://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionlD=45 .
98. CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award (Mar. 14, 2003),
available at http://italaw.com/documents/CME-2003-Final_001.pdf. The case is infamous because
the company won its claim under the Czech-Netherlands BIT while its sole shareholder, Ronald
Lauder, lost his parallel (and identical) claim under the Czech-U.S. BIT. Cf Ronald S. Lauder v.
Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award (Sept. 3, 2001), available at http://italaw.com/sites/defau
It/files/case-documents/itaO451.pdf.
99. Mihir A. Desai & Alberto Moel, CZech Mate: Expropriationand Investor Protection in a Conveging
World, 12 REV. OF FINANCE 221, 222 (2008).
100. Of the 41 cases, 15 had been concluded and 26 were still pending as of the end of January
2011. See Luke Eric Peterson, Argentina by the Numbers: Where Things Stand with Investment Treaty Claims
Ansing out of the Argentine FinancialCrisis, INVESTMENT ARB. REP. (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.iarepor
ter.com/articles/20110201_9.
101. See press reports cited supra note 83.
102. BrandZ Top 100 Most Valuabk Brands 2012, MiLLWARDBROWN.COM (2012), http://www.
millwardbrown.com/brandz/2012/Documents/2012_BrandZTop100 Chart.pdf (showing Marlboro as the seventh most valuable brand worldwide, with a value of $73.6 billion, up 9% from 2011).
103. Gross Domestic ProductRanking Table, WORLDBANK.ORG (Dec. 18, 2013), http://data.worldba
nk.org/data-catalog/GDP-ranking-table.
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Despite the eye-popping numbers and troubling questions - or perhaps because of them - the regulatory chill hypothesis has been hotly
debated within the investment arbitration community. Some claim there is
no evidence of any kind of chill actually occurring in practice, while others
insist they can point to specific instances where governments have declined to take particular regulatory measures for fear of being hit by an
investor-state arbitration claim. 104 These assertions deserve to be investigated from an empirical perspective. For now, what is not subject to debate
is this: in the present Philip Morris dispute, three privately appointed, nonAustralian arbitrators will decide what price Australia must pay, if any, for
its most recent effort to reduce the public health scourge of cigarette
smoking. 0 5
D. CategoricalAccounts:Private Dispute Settlement or Public Governance?
The Sue.7, Abaclat, and Phihp Morris case studies and the foregoing discussion of international investment law's structural peculiarities have
shown that the stakes are high in this game. They have also revealed an
undeniable, intuitive appeal behind the impulse to discuss the regime's
makeup in public/private terms. The trouble with grounding a normative
debate upon intuition, of course, is that it is notoriously fickle. What a foreign investor regards as quite evidently a private issue - and the personal
value that he or she consequently attaches to that fact - may differ quite
dramatically from what a state or its citizens might consider to be private
about that particular investor's investment activities. Much depends upon
one's point of view. 106
Nevertheless, the bulk of the contemporary discourse in international
investment law can be divided into two camps: the private dispute settlement camp and the public regulatory regime camp. Anthea Roberts has
described the battle between the two camps as a clash of paradigms. 07
104. See, e.g., Matthew C. Porterfield & Christopher R. Byrnes, Phiht Morris v. Unguay: Wi/ Investor-State Arbitration Send Restrictions on Tobacco Marketing up in Smoke?, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS
(July 12, 2011), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2011/07/12/philip-morris-v-uruguay-will-investor-state-arb
itration-send-restrictions-on-tobacco-marketing-up-in-smoke/ (stating that the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company's threat to sue Canada under NAFTA chapter 11 "is widely believed to have deterred
the government from taking legislative action on plain packaging').
105. The investment treaty claim is proceeding notwithstanding the fact that Philip Morris just
lost its challenge to the TPP legislation before the Australian High Court. See Simon Chapman, Big
Tobacco Crashes at First Legal Hurdle on PlainPackaging, THE CONVERSATION (Aug. 15, 2012, 1:23 AM
BST), http://theconversation.edu.au/big-tobacco-crashes-at-first-legal-hurdle-on-plain-packaging-88
07.
106. See discussion supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
107. Anthea Roberts, Clash ofParacgms:ActorsandAnalogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107
AM. J. INT'L L. 45 (2013). Roberts actually identifies four competing paradigms: the commercial arbitration, human rights, trade, and public international law paradigms. While she is correct to point out
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This seems correct as a descriptive matter, but it tells us little about whether one paradigm better reflects the interests of the regime's stakeholders or
whether there is reason to believe that one does a better job of resolving
conflict of rights problems than the other. 0 8 In order to consider these
questions, a few words about the two main scholarly perspectives are in
order.
1. PrivateDispute Settlement Framing
The private dispute settlement camp is comprised of those who analogize international investment law to transnational commercial law and regard it as having little or no public impact. They view host states' investment law obligations to foreign investors as akin to private contractual
commitments, and view investor-state arbitration (whether conducted under treaties, contracts, or statutes) as an extension of ordinary commercial
arbitration. This perspective emanates primarily from practitioners and
scholars of international commercial arbitration.109 It remains underdeveloped as a theoretical account of the international investment law regime,"t 0
yet it dominates much of the investor-state arbitral jurisprudence.
The popularity of the approach often puzzles outsiders, but its appeal
becomes clearer when one considers three facts. First, the process by
which investor-state disputes are decided is modeled on international
commercial arbitration.'' Second, around two-thirds of known investment arbitrators hail from a commercial arbitration background.11 2 And
the nuances separating these perspectives, the latter three all share in common the view of international investment law as a type of transnational global governance regime (albeit with different policy
priorities and structural contexts). For my purposes, they can be grouped together and distinguished
from the "international investment law as private dispute settlement" view, which is characteristic
only of the commercial arbitration paradigm.
108. Roberts herself remans agnostic on these questions, predicting that the different paradigms
will continue to do battle, sometimes advancing and sometimes retreating, but that no single paradigm will win out in the end.
109. See sources cited supra note 12.
110. Indeed, there is a paucity of theoretical scholarship on intemational arbitration more broadly. For one attempt at theorizing the field, see EMMANUEL GAILLARD, ASPECTS PHILOSOPHIQUES
DU DROIT DE L'ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL (2008).
111. Four of the six sets of arbitration rules applied most frequently in investor-state arbitrations
(including the UNCITRAL, ICC, LCIA, and SCC rules) were drafted specifically to facilitate contract-based international commercial arbitrations. Only the ICSID and PCA rules have been updated
to accommodate the unique features of treaty-based investor-state arbitration.
112. Waibel & Wu, supra note 65, at 28 (noting that more than sixty percent of known investment
treaty arbitrators in ICSID cases are in full-time private practice and more than half "wear a second
hat as counsel to investor in other ICSID arbitrations"); Brigitte Stem, The Future of InternationalInvestment Law: A Balance Between the Pmtection of Investors and the States' Capaciy to Regulate, in THE EvOLVING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME: EXPECTATIONS, REALITIES, OPTIONS 174, 186 (ose
E. Alvarez & Karl P. Sauvant eds., 2011) (characterizing the current pool of investment arbitrators as
"rooted in international commercial arbitration").
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third, in the latter half of the twentieth century, the vast majority of investor-state disputes involved claims for breach of contract, which for all intents and purposes looked very much like ordinary commercial disputes.113
The private dispute settlement model functions quite well in such circumstances, so it is no surprise that arbitrators from commercial law backgrounds became the go-to appointees for resolving these disputes.
Serious complications arise, however, in transferring the private dispute
settlement mindset from the contract-based world to the treaty-based
world. In contract-based arbitrations, the goal of the tribunal is to hold the
contracting parties accountable to their reciprocal contractual commitments by requiring the breaching party to make the other party whole typically by payment of compensation. This objective respects the principle of party autonomy inasmuch as the disputing parties before the tribunal are the contracting parties themselves. A cardinal corollary here is that
the arbitral tribunal must limit itself to deciding the issues in dispute between the contracting parties on the basis of the contract. Its award is not
permitted to impact upon the rights of any parties who are not before the
tribunal.114
In treaty-based arbitrations, by contrast, only one of the disputing parties - the respondent State - is a contracting party to the treaty. The
other contracting party (the investor's home State) is not before the tribunal, and its views on the proper interpretation of the treaty are often not
known."15 There are no reciprocal obligations between the disputing parties to which the tribunal can hold them mutually accountable, since investment treaties bestow obligations only upon states, not upon investors.
Moreover, the open-textured nature of treaty provisions like "fair and equitable treatment" stands in contradistinction to the specificity of most
contractual obligations. This, in turn, increases the chance that a tribunal's
interpretation and application of a vague treaty provision may inadvertently impact upon the rights of persons not before the tribunal.
Adherents of the private dispute settlement paradigm do not take sufficient account of these three major differences between contract-based and
treaty-based disputes. Rather, they tend to deal with the appearance of
public interest issues within international investment disputes in one of
two ways. The first method is to hide behind the smokescreen of limited
jurisdiction."' 6 For example, a tribunal may claim that it has no jurisdiction
113. See ICSID CASELOAD, supra note 24, at 7 chart 1.
114. With some exceptions for sub-contracting parties, subrogated entities in interest, etc.
115. There are exceptions, such as in the NAFTA system, which allows all three NAFTA contracting States to submit their views on the proper interpretation of the treaty's provisions to any
investor-state tribunal, even when they do not appear as defendant in the particular dispute.
116. This is a natural outgrowth of applying a commercial arbitration mentality, since commercial
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to consider a human rights argument in relation to an alleged investment
17 I
treaty violation, because to do so would constitute an excis de pouvoir.2
label this method a smokescreen because it raises a conundrum wellknown to followers of the ongoing fragmentation debate within international law.11 8 That is, in the name of arbitral restraint, the tribunal asserts
the power to undermine the state's non-investment law-based legal commitments by refusing to take them into account when interpreting the
state's investment-law-based legal commitments. This effectively, even if
unwittingly, aggrandizes investment law at the expense of other bodies of
international and domestic law.119
The second common method for handling conflicts between investor
and non-investor rights within the private dispute settlement framing is by
making conclusory findings of "no actual conflict." The above-described
Suet case illustrates this method well. In that case, the majority of the tribunal found that Argentina was required to respect the foreign-owned water company's original concession terms notwithstanding the fact that the
economic crisis had made the contractually stipulated water prices unaffordable to most citizens of Buenos Aires. It found that there was no actual conflict (i.e., no conflict in law) between Argentina's human rights obligation to ensure uninterrupted access to safe drinking water to its citizens, and its investment law obligation to abide by the contract. In the tribunal's view, Argentina could have done both simultaneously by directly

arbitrators can only exercise jurisdiction over the parties to the contract containing the arbitration
clause and can only authoritatively decide claims arising out of the legal instruments put before them
by the disputing parties.
117. For an argument along these lines, see Matthew Coleman & Kevin Williams, South Africa's
BilateralInvestment Treaies, Black Economic Empowerment and Mining: A Fragmented Meeing, 9 BuS. L.
INT'L 56, 89-94 (2008) (arguing that an investor-state tribunal hearing an investor's challenge to
South Africa's black economic empowerment legislation lacked competence to consider the human
rights purposes of the legislation or the content of South Africa's international human rights treaty
commitments).
118. See generaly Martti Koskenniemi, Report of the Study Grp. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006), available at http://www.un.org/ga/sear
ch/viewdoc.asp?symbol=A/CN.4/L.682.
119. Remarkably, tribunals operating within this mindset often fail to consider other sources of
law notwithstanding the fact that most investment treaties explicitly direct tribunals to apply not only
the provisions of the investment treaty, but also the domestic law of the host state and any relevant
rules of international law. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Argentina for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Dec. 11, 1990, at art. 8(4), 1765 U.N.T.S. 34 (one of the BITs
upon which the SueZ dispute was based; stating: "The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in
accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, the laws of the Contracting party involved in the
dispute, including its rules on conflict of laws, the terms of any specific agreement concluded in relation to such an investment and the applicable principles of international law.').
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subsidizing the cost of the water service at the pre-crisis, contract rate.120
What the tribunal declined to specify, however, was where Argentina might
have found the money to do this in fact in the midst of the liquidity crisis. 12 1 So applied, this second method becomes as much of a mirage as the
first.

The shallowness of both interpretive methods helps explain why amicus
curiae briefs have so far failed to make an appreciable impact on the outcome of investor-state disputes. The private dispute settlement framing of
the regime essentially ignores, rather than resolves, conflicts between the
rights of the investor/claimant and the non-investment-related rights of
others. The fact that this framework is nevertheless still applied in actual
treaty-based investor-state disputes involving clear public interest concerns
is testament to the strong normative pull of the regime's historical commercial arbitration orientation.
2. TransnationalPublic Governance Regime Framing
On the opposite end of the debate are those who analogize international investment law to domestic administrative and/or constitutional law and
regard it as a public governance regime operating on a transnational scale.
Gus van Harten laid the groundwork for this approach with his 2007
book, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public laW.122 In it, he argued that international investment arbitration is best viewed as a transnationalized
form of "public law" in that it essentially reviews the validity of state regulatory actions in a manner reminiscent of domestic constitutional or administrative law orders. A year later, David Schneiderman proffered a kindred analysis, arguing that international investment law was "constitutionalizing economic globalization."1 23 Santiago Montt followed with a 2009
book presenting international investment law as a form of spontaneously
emerging global administrative law.124 And most recently, Stephan Schill
has been advancing the notion of international investment law as "com120. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/19, and AWG Group Ltd. v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on Liability, at
1262 (July 30, 2010), available at http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:iic/443-2010.case.1/IIC
443(2010)D.pdf, ("[u]nder the circumstances of these cases, Argentina's human rights obligations and
its investment treaty obligations are not inconsistent, contradictory, or mutually exclusive. Thus, [in
the tribunal's view], Argentina could have respected both types of obligations.").
121. In making this observation, I do not suggest that the investor should have been forced to
provide free water to the citizens of Buenos Aires. However, had the dispute proceeded as a contractual matter rather than as a treaty matter, the tribunal would have had to consider whether the change
of circumstances brought about by the devaluation of the peso called for a reduction in the originally
specified contractual rate of return.
122. VAN HARTEN, supra note 11.
123. SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 11.
124. MONTr, supra note 11.
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parative public law"1 25 or "international public law" 26 (not to be confused
with public international law) also stressing the regulatory review function
of the regime.127
Each of these works does an admirable job of highlighting the international investment law system's key sources of regime stress. Each points
out the links between these stresses and similar problems found in domestic law - in particular the difficulties inherent in balancing individual
rights and societal interests in the course of adjudication.1 28 What is most
striking about this strand of scholarship, however, given the remarkably
similar way in which its authors conceive of the investment law regime, is
the vastly divergent set of prescriptive recommendations it generates in
addressing the common problems identified.
Van Harten proposes the creation of a standing judicial body, the
"world businessman's court," to eliminate the incentive problems of partyappointed arbitrators. Schneiderman is more concerned about democratic
accountability and therefore favors returning all investment disputes to the
national courts. Montt takes a twofold approach: on the one hand urging
that the system be given time to spontaneously converge upon a detente
stasis through the operation of network effects while on the other hand
urging arbitrators (along with Schill) to help the system along by anchoring
their decisions in comparative administrative law reasoning.
These solutions lie at very different points along the spectrum of possibilities, from proposing a complete scrapping, to a major re-design, to a
mild reform of the existing system. Each solution has its merits and demerits. But taken together as a group, what they point out is that characterizing the international investment law regime as a transnational public governance system does not, on its own, necessarily resolve the tensions between investor and non-investor rights. 129 In fact, it may do no better than
the private dispute settlement characterization of the regime on this
125. IlL & COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW, supra note 11.

126. Schill, New PubicLawApproach, supra note 11.
127. For the most recent installment in the administrative-law-inspired angle, see Jason Webb
Yackee, Controlingthe InternadonalInestmentLawAgeny, 53 HARV. INT'L L.J. 391 (2012).
128. Jack Goldsmith and Daryl Levinson provide an insightful analysis of the similarities between
carrying out this task at the international and domestic levels in Lw for States: Internatona/Ldw,ConstitutionalLaw, Pubic Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791 (2009).
129. I note that parallel discussions about this difficulty are also occurring within international
law more broadly. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, From InternationalLaw to Law and Globa&Zaion, 43
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 485, 518-23 (2005); CUTLER, supra note 42. See also Laura Dickinson,
Pubc Law Values in a PrivatiedWorld, 31 YALE J. INTL L. 383 (2006); LAURA A. DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE: PRESERVING PUBLIC VALUES IN A WORLD OF PRIVATIZED FOR-

EIGN AFFAIRS (2011); Laura A. Dickinson, Publc Values/Private Contract,in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 335 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds.,

2009).
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score. 130 The end result would seem to depend upon which particular approach to "public governance" is adopted.
3. Evaluatingthe Two Paradigms
Does one perspective nevertheless take better account of the competing
stakeholders' interests than the other? At first blush, the private dispute
settlement story appears to align well with the interests of the foreign investors protected by the regime, at least when they find themselves appearing as claimants in disputes with host states. After all, investors who file
investor-state arbitration claims against host states do so for self-interested
reasons. They do not principally concern themselves with the broader societal reverberations of their claims. Rather, they seek to obtain individual
satisfaction of their grievances. A view of international investment law
that focuses on its role as an efficient means for settling specific disputes
comports well with their objectives as investor-claimants.131
As soon as an investor takes off its claimant hat and dons its awardholder's hat, however, the picture changes. At that point, the investor's
main concern is to obtain an actual payout on the award. But to the extent
that the award itself - by failing to show sufficient deference to governmental regulatory prerogatives - invites civil society criticism and generates political opposition, the investor faces a correspondingly reduced prospect of recovery. The actual investor-friendliness of the private dispute
settlement model, at the end of the day, is thus inversely related to the degree to which non-investor concerns are negatively impacted (or perceived
to be impacted) by the award.132
The public governance framing, on the other hand, excels in accounting
for the interests of all who stand outside of the immediate investor-state
relationship - broadly speaking, civil society. It takes a holistic view of a
state's obligations by placing the state's duties to foreign investors under
international investment law alongside its duties to its own citizens under
130. An illuminating side-by-side comparison of public international law and private international
law conflict resolution techniques can be found in Ralf Michaels & Joost Pauwelyn, Conlct ofNorms
or Confct of Laws?: Dzferent Techniques in the Fragmentationof Puhkc InternationalLaw, 22 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 349 (2012).
131. Whether this view is also preferred by foreigners in their role as putative investors is a more
difficult question. It depends upon strategic and market-based considerations, such as whether the
putative investor would be indemnified against any losses caused by changes in the host state's regulations in circumstances wherein a major competitor would not be so indemnified (e.g., because the
latter does not enjoy the protection of an investment treaty) or the other way around.
132. The investors who hold awards against Argentina as a result of its financial crisis, all of
which remain unpaid, can attest to this inverse relationship. See Foreign-InvestmentDisputes: Come and
Get Me, Argentina is Puting InternationalArbitrationto the Test, ECONOMIST, Feb 18, 2012, at 40, available
at http://www.economist.com/node/21547836.
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domestic law and to other national and transnational constituencies under
other bodies of international law. The public governance view thus incorporates civil society concerns to a much greater degree than the private
dispute settlement story.
Its major weakness is that it paints with too broad a brush. While many
investor-state disputes do raise important governance concerns, as illustrated by the Sue.-, Abadat, and Phikp Morris cases, not all of them do. It is
not clear what might be gained by analyzing ordinary investor-state breach
of contract claims, for example, through the lens of global administrative
law, global constitutional law, or international public law. Most of the authors writing within the transnational public governance stream have left
such disputes to the side, so far. Given that contract-based disputes likely
outnumber treaty-based disputes in any given year, this omission is significant. 133 It could lead to the promulgation of regime reform recommendations (like abolition) that are entirely out of whack with the underlying realities of investor-state arbitration.
What about states' interests within the regime? Again, it might appear
that the public governance framing of international investment law does a
good job of taking these into account. If states are viewed as faithful representatives of their citizenry consistent with the traditional
fiction
then
this
might
well be so. But since quite a
Westphalian legal
few of the states participating in the international investment law regime
are not of the democratic sort,134 it is doubtful whether the interests of
states are always aligned with the interests of their domestic constituencies.
Some states might be quite happy to sacrifice certain public welfare objectives on the altar of foreign investment protection (and thus prefer the
private dispute settlement model); others less so.
Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that states appear only as defendants (never claimants) in treaty-based investor-state disputes. 13 5 When
operating at the international treaty-making level, by contrast - as they do
when concluding investment treaties - states occupy the driver's seat. They
view themselves as sovereigns bound by nothing but their own voluntary
consent.136 International relations scholars have long argued that power
133. The precise number of contract-based investor-state claims is not known since most of
them are probably arbitrated in venues other than ICSID and are therefore never made public.
134. In the past ten years, for example, China has been one of the most active countries in pursuing international investment agreements with other states. See generaly Schill, supra note 29.
135. States may bring counterclaims in some circumstances, but only after an investor has initiated an arbitration proceeding against the State in the first place.
136. This is permissible under the principle of sovereign equality, as articulated in the well-known
"Lotus principle," as described in Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10,
at 18 (Sept. 7, 1927), although states are of course still subject to peremptory norms of international
law.

2014]

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ININVESTMENT LAW

401

differentials among states play a key role in the making and sometimes
breaking of international law.137 If they are right, then it is difficult to see
why strong states should embrace the idea of international investment law
as a type of transnational public governance regime, since this would entail
an unnecessary relinquishment of their power advantages on the international plane. In short, neither side of the international investment regime's
ongoing public versus private categorical debate seems to fully capture the
interests of investors, states, or third parties.' 3 8
All of this begs the question whether the tension is really about the regime's "public" versus "private" nature at all, or whether these labels are
misnomers serving to obscure deeper normative disagreements between
competing sets of stakeholders. In the next Part, I peel back another layer
of the onion by asking what meaning the terms "public" and "private"
actually have in the everyday practice of international investment law.
II. BETWEEN RIHETORIC AND REALITY: INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW'S PUBLIC/PRIVATE OVERLAPS AND DIsJUNCTIONS
Legal scholars have historically distinguished between public and private
along three classical axes. The first is the distinction between public and
private actors; the second, between public law and private law; and the
third, between public international law and private international law. In this
Part, I consider whether any of these classical distinctions is borne out by
international investment law, such that the debate over the regime's public
versus private nature might be meaningful along one or more of the three
axes.
A. Public and PrivateActors and Functions
One possible means of differentiating between public and private is to
look at the actors involved. This can be done in one of two ways. The first
is to reserve the term "public" exclusively for states and their subnational
levels of government and apply the label "private" to all non-state actors.
This seems to be the usage underlying the public/private tension in the
Abaclat case: the public (state) fisc is put in peril by the financial claims of
private (non-state) actors. The second way of differentiating between public and private is to make a distinction between the individual and the collective. The Suet case illustrates this usage by pitting the contract rights of
137. See, e.g., JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS (2001); Ste-

phen D. Krasner, State Power and the Structure of InternationalTrade, 28 WORLD POL. 317 (1976); Nico
Krisch, InternationalLaw in Times of Hegemony: UnequalPower and the Shaping of the InternationalLegal Order, 16 EuR. J. INT'L L. 369 (2005).
138. At least not when viewed from a rational choice perspective.
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private (individual) investors against the general public's (collective) right
of access to water. Regulatory chill concerns appear to blend the two usages. In the Phikj Morris dispute, for example, the fear is that privately held
(by individual, non-state actors) intellectual property rights might make
regulating in the interests of public (collective) health too expensive for
the public (state) fisc.
How do these two actor-based usages line up with the structural features of international investment law? To answer this question, it is necessary to consider the lawmaking and dispute-resolution levels of the regime
separately. On the lawmaking side, investment law's three main permutations involve three different sets of actors. International investment treaties are concluded between states (public-public). Investment promotion
and protection statutes are enacted unilaterally by domestic governments
(public). Investor-state contracts are negotiated between specific states and
specific investors (public-private). As a result, an actor-based public/private distinction seems to signal potential public/private conflicts at
the substantive lawmaking level only in the case of investor-state contracts,139 and then only if the state/non-state usage is adopted. The individual/collective usage has no obvious relevance to the investment lawmaking process. 140
At the level of dispute resolution, by contrast, there is always nominally
a government on one side of the equation and an investor on the other.
This holds true irrespective of whether the dispute arises under a treaty,
statute, or contract. Thus, all three types of disputes appear, as a matter of
first impression, to comport with the state/non-state usage of the public/private actors divide. This impression breaks down upon closer inspection, however. Most disputes arising under investor-state contracts involve
ordinary commercial transactions. In commercial relations, respect for
principles such as the autonomy of the parties and the need to preserve
the benefit of their bargain requires adjudicators to treat states as ordinary

139. This observation seems counterintuitive in light of the fact that most of the recent public
outcry over international investment law has been directed at treaty-based law, not investor-state
contracts. One possible explanation might be that the obviousness of the public/private tensions
inherent in investor-state contracts leads states to negotiate them much more carefully than investment treaties, the majority of which were not expected (at least not at the time of their original negotiation) to have much public bite.
140. One could attempt to give it relevance by complicating the analysis with public choice theory considerations. For example, it may well be the case that some groups exert a greater influence
over domestic lawmaking or treaty ratification processes than others. However, since public choice
theory variables such as political power, access, and funding may rest with either discrete individuals
or large groups, it is still difficult to describe the international investment lawmaking process in individual versus collective terms. One would need to devise some way of determining what percentage
of the potentially affected population enjoyed effective representation during the lawmaking process.
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contracting parties, which essentially turns these disputes into privateprivate affairs.
Treaty-based and statute-based disputes are different in that they need
not involve a specific contract between an investor and a statel 41 and need
not arise out of ordinary commercial relations. Even so, it is not obligatory

that the dispute must be between a state and a non-state actor. Stateowned enterprises make up only a tiny fraction of transnational corporations worldwide, but in 2012 their outward investment accounted for eleven percent of global FDI.142 Similarly, while relatively few countries maintain sovereign wealth funds, those that do have a huge number of assets
under management, many of which are invested abroad.143 And since most
investment treaties and domestic investment statutes do not exclude stateowned companies or sovereign wealth funds from their broad definitions
of investors and investments,144 it is entirely possible to have state actors
on both sides of the dispute.145 The arbitration community, at least, appears to accept that this is so.146
Conversely, it is also possible to have non-state actors in interest on
both sides of the dispute. This can happen where a state delegates a governmental function to a non-state company, and then the company does
something that violates the state's investment treaty or statutory obligations toward a foreign investor.147 Here, the international law principles on
141. In the case of investment treaties that contain an umbrella clause (obligating the state to
abide by any specific commitments it makes to a foreign investor), it is possible to get a mix of con-

tract and treaty claims.
142. WIR 2013, supra note 27, at xiv.
143. Id (noting that "[c]umulative FDI by SWFs is estimated at $127 billion" and pointing out
that "more than 70 per cent of SWFs' FDI in 2012 was targeted at developed economies").
144. Many Middle Eastern treaties even expressly include them.
145. There has been at least one investment treaty case in which a state entity (the regional government of Kaliningrad) was deemed a protected investor under a BIT. The award remains unpublished, but was reported in Luke Eric Peterson, Lithuania Prevails in Investor-State BIT Claim Brought
b Russian Regional Government: ICC Tribunal Rules that Enforcement of Commercial ArbitrationAward in
Lithuania Cannot Be Challenged as an Expropriation Under BIT, INVESTMENT ARB. REP., Mar. 17, 2009,
at 4 (2009).
146. See Claudia Annacker, Protection andAdmission of Sovereign Investment under Investment Treaties, 10
CHINESE J. INT'L L. 531, 531-37 (2011). For scholarly perspectives on the complexities of regulating
sovereign wealth funds and state-owned enterprises, see Larry Cati Backer, Sovereign Invesing in Times
of Crisis: GlobalRegulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds, State-Owned Enterprises, and the ChineseExperience, 19
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (2010); Joel Slawotsky, Sovereign Wealth Funds as Emeging
FinancialSuperpowers: How U.S. Regulators Should Respond, 40 GEO. J. INT'L. L. 1239 (2009). A more
general discussion of some of the international law problems raised by multinational corporations can
be found in Jose E. Alvarez, Am Corporations "Subjects" ofInternationalLaw?,9 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L
L. 1 (2011); Joel Slawotsky, The Global Corporationas InternationalLawActor, 52 VA.J. INT'L L. DIG. 79
(2012).
147. There is a large literature on the public accountability issues attending the delegation of sovereign powers to pnvate companies. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Outsourcing Is Not Our On# Problem,
76 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1216 (2008) (reviewing PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY:
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attribution come into play to transform the non-state company into a state
actor, thereby rendering the state liable for the company's actions under
international law.148 All of these scenarios seem to undermine the utility of
the strict state/non-state distinction between public and private in international investment disputes.' 49
As for the individual/collective distinction, it too suffers challenges.
First, there is the question of whether claims by multiple claimants may
properly be classified as individual, and, if so, up to what threshold. Most
investment disputes have historically involved between one and five claimants. In the Abaclat matter, however, 180,000 claimants participated in the
initial filing. If international investment law has now entered an era in
which mass arbitrations are possible, then pouring public and private tensions through the individual/collective sieve begins to fit ill.
In addition to the numbers problem, there are questions as to who is
counted among the collective and who gets to speak for the collective interest. Some commentators have pointed out that the activities of nongovernmental organizations might qualify as protected investments under
investment treaties.15 0 This raises the prospect that an investment dispute
might involve a state (as representative of the public) on one side, versus a
civil society organization (as representative of the public interest) on the
other. Which one speaks for the collective "public" in such a case? Does it
matter whether the state is democratic or authoritarian? Does the breadth
of the civil society organization's support base - local, national, transnational - make a difference? What if the civil society organization is a
business lobby instead of a human rights or environmental group?

WHY PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE
CAN Do ABOUT IT (2007)); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatiationas Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367
(2003); Martha Minow, Partners,Not Rivals?: Redrawing the Lines Between Public andPrivate,Non-Profit and
Profit, andSecular and Religious, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1061 (2000); Jody Freeman, Private Parties,PublicFunctions andthe NewAdministrativeLaw, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813 (2000).
148. See Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts, art. 5, in
Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, to the Gen. Assembly on the Work of its Fifty-Third Sess., 53rd Sess.,
Apr. 23-June 1, July 1-Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, reprintedin Yearbook of the International
Law Commission 2001, vol. 2, pt. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), U.N. Sales
No. E.04.V.17 (Part 2) (2007), availble at http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commen
taries/9 6_2001.pdf.
149. Admittedly, the state action doctrine may make it possible to rescue the actor-based distinction in at least some of the scenarios sketched. However, that doctrine has itself been subject to
considerable criticism, which puts into question the wisdom of resorting to it in order to rescue an
already dubious distinction. See Richard S. Kay, The State Action Doctrine, the Public-PrivateDistinction,
and the Independence of ConstitutionalLaw, 10 CONST. COMIENT. 329, 334 (1993) (finding that the
scholarly attack on the public-private distinction was successful and that there are no private actions).
150. Luke Eric Peterson & Nick Gallus, InternationalInvestment Trea!y Protection of Not-for-Profit OrganiZations,INT'LJ. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., Dec. 2007, at 47.
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This points to another drawback of the individual/collective taxonomy:
the difficulty in ascertaining the degree to which particular rights or interests actually benefit discrete individuals (e.g., particular investors) versus
society as a whole. The ICSID Convention was concluded in the belief

that the protection of individual investor rights would increase the crossborder flow of investment to developing countries, which would in turn
stimulate their economies and improve the general welfare of their populations.15 Unfortunately, empiricists have found little support for the first
leg in this chain of assumptions. 152
But by the same token, the competing thesis - that the societal good is
best advanced through the assertion of collective rights - is also contested. This is because the concept of "public interest" is vulnerable to capture by specialized interest groups. Just as it may be difficult to determine
in which circumstances the protection of individual investor rights may
serve the collective interest, it may be equally difficult to ascertain whether
the rights and interests asserted by actors other than investors actually
serve the collective interest versus that of the asserting party. As one
scholar has noted:
If, however, "public" means serving the interest of the community,
and "private" means serving the interest of the individual, it may be
a conceptual error to separate the "public" from the individuals
within it. The terms "public" and "private," if used to describe
community or individual returns, may be similar to that proverbial
glass of water, which may be half full or half empty depending on
perspective. A different terminology is in order, one that does not
automatically tar one perspective as selfish and one perspective as
altruistic .... Many of the so-called public interests represent the
individual preferences, desires, or convictions of the parties supporting them. 5 3
Such difficulties suggest that individual and collective rights are inseparably intertwined. Both may play an important role in protecting and pro-

1

151. See REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS, supra note 23, 9. The preambles to many international investment treaties reflect the same optimistic trickle down assumption. Barton Legum,
Defining Investment and Investor Who is Entitled to Claim?, in ICSID, OECD & UNCTAD Symposium,
Making the Most of International Investment Agreements: A Common Agenda, Paris, France, Dec.
12, 2005, at 2, 2 n.1 ("Desiring to create favourable conditions for greater investment by nationals
and companies of one State in the territory of the other State; Recognising that the encouragement
and reciprocal protection under international agreement of such investments will be conducive to the
stimulation of individual business initiative and will increase prosperity in both States . .. ."), available

at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/internationalinvestmentagreements/36370461.pdf.
152. See Yackee, supranote 57 and references cited therein.
153. Marla E. Mansfield, When 'Private" Rights Meet 'Public" Rights: The Problems ofLabeling andRegulatory Takings, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 193,201-02 (1994).
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moting the interests of society, just as both may be used to protect and
promote the interests of individuals.
For all of these reasons, neither of the principal actor-based characterizations of the public/private divide provides a firm anchor to which one
might attach a meaningful debate concerning the international investment
law regime's public versus private nature.
B. Public InternationalLaw and PrivateInternationalLaw Sources and Methods
Does the divide between public international law and private international law supply the distinction sought? Public international law has historically referred to the set of norms "having their source in the international community of States."1 54 It includes norms binding upon states in
their relations with one another 5 5 and by extension norms binding as between states and the international organizations created by states.15 6 It also
extends to norms applicable in the relations between states and individuals
in circumstances where these norms derive either from international treaties157 or from customary international law.' 58
By contrast, private international law - or international conflict of
laws, as it is referred to in some jurisdictions 5 9 - comprises "the body of
norms applied in international cases to determine the judicial jurisdiction
of a State, the choice of the particular system or systems of law to be applied in reaching a judicial decision, and the effect to be given a foreign
judgment."1 60 These rules may derive either from domestic or international
law.'6 '
Contemporary international investment law, meanwhile, allows for the
three basic types of claims by foreign investors against states already de154. John R. Stevenson, The Relationship of Private InternationalLaw to Pubic InternationalLaw, 52
COLUM. L. REv. 561, 561 (1952).
155. J. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW

OF PEACE 1 (4th ed. 1949).
156. The International Court of Justice effectuated this extension in the International Court of
Justice Advisory Opinion, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949
I.C.J. Reports, 174, Advisory Opinion (Apr. 11, 1949), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/fil
es/4/1837.pdf.
157. International human rights treaties and international investment treaties both fall within this
class.
158. This is the case, for example, of the international customary law minimum standard of
treatment for aliens, which was the forerunner of the fair and equitable treatment standard now contained in most modern investment treaties. See, e.g., MONIT, supra note 11, ch. 1.
159. See, e.g., ALBERT VENN DICEY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1908).

160. Stevenson, supra note 154, at 561-62. Note, however, that some of these issues may be removed from the realm of private international law by treaty. This is the case, for example, with the
New York Convention, supra note 2.
161. Id at 564-67 (discussing "diverse views of the relationship" between public and private international law, some of which give pride of place to international law and others to municipal law).

2014]1

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN INVESTMENT LAW

407

scribed above: treaty-based, contract-based, and statute-based.162 In considering the three classes, the first (treaty-based claims) clearly originates in
public international law;' 63 the second (contract-based claims)164 Will in
most cases call for the application of private international law rules; and
the third (claims based on domestic investment statutes) may implicate
either public or private international law, or indeed neither or both, depending upon the terms of the domestic statute.
Can it fairly be said that at least one of these types is fundamentally
about private dispute settlement while another is about public governance?
In a word: no. The central difficulty in all three types of claims lies in deciding how to reconcile states' obligations toward investors on the one
hand, with their obligations toward non-investors, on the other. This difficulty arises irrespective of whether public international law or private international law applies.
If one limits the scope of the inquiry to investment disputes brought
under international investment treaties, as many authors on the public
governance side of the debate have done,165 the basic problem unfolds as
follows. Most investment treaties grant a specified set of arbitrallyenforceable protections to a defined class of foreign investors. These protections necessarily exist under public international law, since the protection-granting instrument is itself an international treaty. But other public
international law instruments protect the rights of individuals and groups
other than investors in diverse areas, including human rights, environmental protection, cultural preservation, financial regulation, trade, and international peace and security.
This multivalent norms scenario was precisely the sticking point in the
Suer, case discussed above.166 There, several NGOs invoked the Argentine
consumers' right to water under the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights in opposition to the investors' assertion of their
162. The latter two possibilities were the ones primarily envisaged by the ICSID Convention at
the time of its adoption. Existing lAs did not then provide for investor-state dispute settlement,
only state-to-state arbitration. Indeed, the possibility of treaty-based investor-state dispute settlement
appears to have taken the international arbitration community by surprise. See Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV. 232 (1995).
163. In many treaty-based disputes, arbitral tribunals may also find it necessary to have recourse
to principles of private international law to determine the extent of an investor's rights under an
international contract (since contract rights constitute a protected interest under most investment
treaties) or in applying a treaty's "umbrella clause."
164. For a discussion of the problem of reconciling investors' private rights with public interests
under a concession contract, see Laura Henry, Investment Agreement Claims Under the 2004 Model U.S.
BIT:A Challengefor State Police Powet?, 31 U. PA.J. INT'L L. 935, 936 (2010).
165. The above-mentioned works by Montt, Schill, Schneiderman, and Van Harten cited supra
note 11, for example, all deal only with treaty-based investor-state disputes.
166. See cases cited supra note 77 and accompanying discussion.
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investment treaty-based right to realize the full extent of their profit entitlements in respect of the Buenos Aires water concession. Both sets of
obligations arose out of public international law. Both were subject to the
public international law principles governing the interpretation of treaties.167 The central conflict manifested itself as one of public international
law versus public international law. Yet this did not prevent the arbitral
tribunal from deciding the dispute under the private dispute settlement
model while civil society pundits decried its negative public health impact. 168
What of private international law? Do contract-based investor-state disputes, at the very least, fall squarely within the realm of private dispute
settlement, to the exclusion of public governance concerns? Often, perhaps, but not always. To see why not all contract-based disputes are of
purely private concern, one need only imagine what the Suet dispute might
have looked like had it proceeded as a contract-based arbitration rather
than as a treaty-based one.169 This alternate scenario would involve the
same facts, the same contractual rights, and the same set of public policy
concerns (the right to uninterrupted access to water) that emerged in the
wake of Argentina's economic crisis. The legal claims and defenses of the
disputing parties would differ, however. The investors would be limited to
bringing claims for breach of contract,170 since the tribunal would have no
jurisdiction to decide claims of expropriation and the like. The government, for its part, could take advantage of contractual defenses that were
unavailable to it in the treaty setting, such as impossibility or changed circumstances.' 7'
This re-orientation of the dispute would no doubt significantly impact
the manner in which the case would be pled and defended. What it would
not do is alter the fundamental task faced by the tribunal. The arbitrators
167. Vienna Convention, supra note 84, arts. 31-32.
168. The same problem arises in disputes brought pursuant to domestic investment statutes. In
such cases, domestic law defines the scope of the investors' rights and the state's obligations to the
investor and likewise defines the scope of non-investors' rights and the state's obligations to noninvestors. Statute-based investor-state disputes, too, must balance investor and non-investor rights in
some fashion. The difference is that, in a statutory setting, this is usually accomplished by applying
the domestic legal system's constitutional and other legal parameters, whereas in the public international law setting it should theoretically proceed under the public international law principles governing conflict of norms.
169. The concession contract did provide for contract-based arbitration of many of the investors'
claims. The decision to initiate a treaty-based arbitration instead was strategic.
170. And perhaps some ancillary claims arising by reason of the contract, such as unjust enrichment or tortious conversion of property.
171. Though these might be unsuccessful given that good faith principles in contract law typically
estop parties from claiming these defenses in circumstances where their own behavior led to the
change in circumstances or made it impossible to fulfill the contract.
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would still have to decide whether, on balance, the investors should receive
the full amount of their contractually stipulated thirty-year returns (expectation damages), or whether, on balance, the circumstances were such that
some lesser recovery would be warranted (reliance damages, perhaps). In
the end, the discretion left to the tribunal in the contractual scenario mirrors that of the tribunal in the treaty scenario, because the same competing
rights and obligations problem appears in both settings.
Moreover, all putatively private dispute settlement systems are embedded in broader public (in the sense of state-sanctioned) legal regimes. They
derive their authority, efficacy, and legitimacy from the support lent to
them by the legal machinery of states. In contract-based investment arbitration, the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards plays this backstop role.172 Like the ICSID
Convention, which serves a similar function in treaty-based arbitrations,
the New York Convention is a public international law instrument. The
public international law and private international law sides of the investment arbitration coin are thus integrally linked at the enforcement stage,
irrespective of which body of law breathes life into the disputes at the filing stage.
What these considerations make clear is that the debate over whether
international investment law is a private dispute settlement system or a
transnational public governance regime does not map onto the distinction,
such as it is, between private international law and public international law.
In consequence, this division cannot provide a conceptual foothold for
either perspective.
C Public Law and PrivateLaw Claims and Defenses
The third classical public/private distinction found in legal discourse is
that separating public law from private law. Both common law and civil law
systems historically recognized a distinction between these two types of
law, though on the basis of different legal philosophies.
In the civil law tradition, private law traditionally consisted of "that area
of the law in which the sole function of government was the recognition
and enforcement of private rights."173 The nineteenth century civil codes
of the major continental European powers concretized these private law
rights, with property rights and contract rights being paramount among

172. New York Convention, supra note 2. The New York Convention regulates the manner and
circumstances in which states agree to place their judicial enforcement mechanisms at the disposal of
parties attempting to collect on international arbitration awards.
173. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PEREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIViL LAW TRADITION:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 92 (3d ed. 2007).
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them. 174 The driving consideration behind public law, on the other hand,
"was the effectuation of the public interest by state action."17 5 As explained by Merryman and Periz-Perdomo:
Public law had, from this point of view, two major components:
constitutional law in the classic sense - the law by which the governmental structure is constituted -

and administrative law -

the

law governing the public administration and its relations with private individuals. In private legal relations the parties were equals
and the state the referee. In public legal relations the state was a
party, and as a representative of the public interest (and successor
to the prince) it was a party superior to the private individual.176
In the English common law tradition, by contrast, private law rights included not only rights in property and contract but also rights of personal
security and personal liberty.1" Blackstone described them as absolute
rights "inherent in every Englishman," 7 8 comprising "either that residuum
(remainder) of natural liberty, which is not required by the laws of society
to be sacrificed to public convenience: or else those civil privileges, which
society hath engaged to provide, in lieu of the natural liberties so given up
by individuals." 7 9 These private common law rights were held to pre-exist
statutory (or codified) law - a view subsequently transferred to American
law as well.o80 Nineteenth-century Anglo-American jurists conceived of
public law rights, for their part, as "claims that were owned by the government - the sovereign people as a whole - rather than in persons' individual capacities."' 8 ' Regulatory claims by individuals against the government did not originally fall under the domain of public law.182
174. Id. at 92. Family law, rights of succession (trusts and estates), and delict (or tort) are also
among the subject matters that may fall under private law in civil law systems, though different civil
law jurisdictions may classify some of these matters differently
175. Id at 92-93.
176. Id at 93. As the authors go on to note, the civil law reinforced this distinction by dividing
the court system into two branches: administrative courts (overseeing public law matters) and ordinary courts (handling private law matters). This correspondence was not always perfect, however, as
criminal law (widely considered in the continental European tradition to be a matter of public law)
was assigned to the ordinary courts rather than the administrative courts.
177. WILLiAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 125, 130, 134

(1979). Interestingly, the latter two categories would have included many rights that we now identify
as human rights (and consequently associate with public law, not private law).
178. Id. at 138.
179. Id. at 129 (emphasis omitted).
180. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 171 (1803) (mentioning the "absolute
rights of individuals'); JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 1 (1827) ("The absolute rights of individuals may be resolved into the right of personal security, the right of personal
liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property. These rights have been justly considered, and
frequently declared, by the people of this country, to be natural, inherent, and unalienable.").
181. Ann Woolhandler, Pub/c Rgbts, Private Rigbts, and Statutory Retractinky, 94 GEO. L.J. 1015,
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Over time, of course, the traditional civil law and common law distinctions between public law and private law have both confronted theoretical
and practical difficulties. The rise of the regulatory state - under the auspices of modern constitutions explicitly limiting the scope of private rights
in accordance with the public interest - has made it apparent that the
content of private rights is shaped not solely by their definition in civil
codes but by their circumscription by public law principles. 183 Where public law plays an important role in defining the private rights of individuals
inter se, the government can no longer be seen as a mere neutral referee
resolving private disputes between private parties.184

The trend toward increasing government participation in market-based
economic activities, meanwhile, undermines the traditional assumption
that all government action necessarily occurs within the public law domain.18 5 This accordingly questions the entitlement of governments to a
superior status in all legal proceedings. Moreover, in the contemporary
Anglo-American understanding, the government no longer holds a monopoly over public law claims. Individual citizens and groups of citizens
may now assert public law claims against the government or against other
private citizens.186 These challenges and others have forced both civil and
common law scholars to propose doctrinal modifications to traditional
public law/private law divisions,1 87 with the result that they no longer correspond tightly to the distinction between personal and societal rights.
In the United States, one could even go so far as to say that the concepts of public law and private law have in any event lost much of their
force.' 88 Modern U.S. law faculties are not divided into public law and pri1020 (2006) (internal citations omitted). See also id. at 1021 (listing five classes of rights falling within
the nineteenth-century conception of public rights).
182. This understanding slowly morphed, however, such that by the late twentieth century public
law rights had taken on "a broad connotation of constitutional or statutory claims asserted in the
perceived public interest against government or regulated parties." Id. at 1021 (citing Abram Chayes,
The Rok ofthe judge in PubLc law Litzgation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1284, 1316 (1976)).
183. See MERRYMAN & PEREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 173, at 94-96 (exploring five challenges to
the distinction and concluding that "dichotomies like public law and private law seem to lose their
utility").
184. See sources cited supra notes 14-19.
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., Woolhandler, supra note 181, at 1021-22 (describing this new breed of public law
claims as a hybrid between the nineteenth-century classifications of public law and private law
claims).
187. For a comparison of U.S. and German evolutions in the concepts, see Ralf Michaels & Nils
Jansen, Private Law Beyond the State?: Europeani7ation,Globadkation, Privati.Zation,54 AM. J. CoMP. L. 843
(2006).
188. This is in part due to the gradual elision of the terms by scholars. See Randy E. Barnett, Fonvword: FourSenses ofthe Pubc Law-Private Law Distinction, 9 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 267 (1986) (identifying four different senses of the public law-private law distinction in American legal thought and
stressing that all four have become inseparably intertwined); see also Duncan Kennedy, The Stages ofthe
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vate law departments, as are many of their counterparts in other parts of
the world. And while subject matter specializations proliferate, most U.S.
scholarly writing now treats law as a unitary, rather than bifurcated, field.189
Interestingly, despite this erosion - or some might say confusion - in
the distinction between public and private law, U.S. lawyers and legal scholars have served as the primary progenitors and champions of the "public
interest law" movement, which seeks to strategically deploy the law in furtherance of the common (as opposed to individual) good.190 This may
help to explain why American NGOs have been at the forefront of attempts to re-align international investment law with the "public interest." 191 Indeed, the modern American concept of public interest law' 92
might be the idea that best explains the ongoing drive to reconcile public
and private interests within international investment law.
Be that as it may, the upshot of the present discussion is that using the
terms "public" and "private" says little about the underlying legal classification of the rights at stake in the contemporary investment regime. Most
international investment agreements allow investors to claim damages for
harms done to both private law and public law rights. This is so whether
one adopts a civil law or common law understanding of the terms. For
example, the typical investment treaty's expropriation clause empowers
investors to claim damages for violations of their property and contract
rights (traditionally private law claims), while its fair and equitable treatment clause empowers them to claim damages for violations of certain
public law rights, such as the rights to procedural fairness, transparency,
and non-discrimination. On the other side of the dispute, states may raise
Decline ofthe Pubkc/PrivateDistinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982); Morton J. Horwitz, The Histoy of
the Publc/PrivateDisdndion, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1426 (1982).
189. Indeed, I would posit that modem U.S. law now conceives of all law as essentially public in
nature. For arguments along these lines, documenting the decline of private law in the United States,
see Chaim Saiman, Pubc Law, Private Law, and Legal Science, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 691, 692-97 (2008);
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE
AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 623, 630 (Jules Coleman & Scott J. Shapiro eds., 2002) (noting that the
predominant position had become one of regarding "the distinction between private and public law
as artificial in the pejorative sense of that term').
190. See Scott L. Cummings & Louise G. Trubek, Globai#ngPubc Interest Law, 13 UCLA J. INT'L
L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1 (2008) (providing an account of the globalization of the American practice).
191. The Center for International Environmental Law has been a leader in this regard. For a description of the Center's activities, see CENTER FOR INT'L ENVTL. L. (last visited Mar. 14, 2014),
http://www.ciel.org/AboutUs/index.html. The International Institute for Sustainable Development (a Canadian organization) is another leading example. See THE INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEV. (last visited Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.iisd.org/investment/.
192. For U.S. perspectives on why lawyers should perform public interest work, see Tigran W.
Eldred & Thomas Schoenherr, The Laayer's Duty of Pubc Senice: More Than Chariy?, 96 W. VA. L.
REV. 367 (1994); Steven Lubet & Cathryn Stewart, A 'PubcAssets" Theory of Lanyers'ProBono Obkgations, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1245 (1997); Deborah L. Rhode, Pro Bono in Principaland in Practice, 26
HAMLINEJ. PUB. L. & POLY 315 (2005).
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either private law defenses - for example defenses of justification or excuse for breach of contract - or public law defenses such as public necessity. A given dispute may indeed involve a complex mixture of several
types of claims and defenses.
In short, many investment arbitration cases simply do not fall neatly
along public law/private law lines. Debates over the appropriate role of
international investment law in regulating the world economy nevertheless
continue to be framed in public versus private terms. If one looks closely,
however, the principal questions underlying what the relevant actors perceive to be the public/private dilemma are twofold: firstly, who benefits
from the competing rights and interests at stake, and secondly, how and by
whom are the competing claims to be balanced? These questions persist
irrespective of whether the competing rights and interests sound in public
law or private law in any particular legal tradition.' 93
D. What's Left: Public and Pnvate as Decision Rules?
If none of the three classical legal distinctions between public and private rings true in international investment law, we are left with a puzzle:
why has the debate over the regime's essential nature shaped up in public/private terms? The most prominent explanation advanced to date centers on the sociologically-fractured epistemic community of international
investment lawyers.194 The argument goes that since the majority of investment arbitrators come from private law or commercial dispute settlement backgrounds, and the majority of investment law scholars come
from public law or public international law backgrounds, it makes sense
that the former would view the regime's function in private terms and the
latter in public terms.195 To a person with a hammer, everything looks like
a nail.
Anyone who has ever attended two investment law conferences on the
same topic in the same year - one organized by a group of public law
scholars and the other by representatives of the so-called "arbitration mafia" - can attest that this explanation carries weight. It would be difficult
193. It is interesting to note, however, that notwithstanding the historical understanding, some
more contemporary authors seem to have redefined "public law" and "private law" in terms of the
individual versus collective conception I described above. See, e.g., Harry Woolf, Pubc Law - Private
Law: Why the Divide?:A PersonalView, 1986 PUB. L. 220, 221.
194. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 107; Moshe Hirsch, The Sociolog of InternationalInvestment Law, in
THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: BRINGING THEORY INTO PRACTICE,
(Z. Douglas, J. Pauwelyn & J.E. Visluales eds., forthcoming July 2014) (on file with author); Stephan
W. Schill, W(b)itherFragmentadion?:On the LiteratureandSociologv ofInternationalInvestment Law, 22 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 875 (2011); David Schneiderman, JudicialPoklics and InternationalInvestment Arbitration:Seeking
an Explanationfor Confcting Outcomes, 30 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 383 (2010).
195. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 107.
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to overstate how differently the discourse unfolds across the two conference settings. Still, most articulations of the sociological explanation are
incomplete in that they focus on only a subset of the investment regime's
epistemic community without taking sufficient account of other subsets,

such as state lawmakers and treaty negotiators, civil society activists, the inhouse counsel of large multinational companies, and the institutional personnel who staff the major arbitration institutions.196
An illustration from the civil society angle will help explain why one
should not focus the sociological camera lens too narrowly. Civil society
advocates primarily invoke the public/private rhetoric for its emotive value. 197 I presaged this point in the headings used to introduce the three
public/private clashes described in Part I above - all of which reflected
the emotive framing of the public interest perspective. After all, what
could be worse than allowing private property rights to trump public
health concerns (Philrj Morris) or private contract rights to compromise the
public's access to water (Sue.) or private profit expectations to wipe out the
public fisc (Abaclat? To ask the question in this manner is to presuppose
the answer. It taints the investment law regime with a sense of injustice,
which in turn assists public interest groups in mobilizing resources to advance their particular viewpoints.
Yet industry groups are civil society organizations too. They, too, can
deploy public/private rhetoric as an emotional subtext to help them
achieve their objectives. After all, if private businesses serve the greater
good by creating employment, driving technological innovation, and fueling economic growth, what could be worse than allowing a greedy government to abolish hard-earned private property rights without paying any
compensation (Phihp Morris) or abuse its sovereign powers to appropriate
to itself all of the benefits of a bilateral contract (Suet) or invoke sovereign
immunity to avoid repaying its debts to the investors who have financed its
very existence (Abada)? Framing the same three disputes in the inverse
manner evokes a similar emotional reaction to the seeming unfairness of
the underlying events - at least in the absence of the other side of the
story.

This consideration of how civil society organizations use the terms
"public" and "private" usefully brings two insights to the fore. First, emo196. I explain the importance and close-knit nature of the regime's epistemic community in Julie
A. Maupin, Transpartng in InternaionalInoestment Law: The Good, the Bad, and the Murky, in TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 142 (Andrea Bianchi & Anne Peters eds., 2013) (analyzing the investment law regime's major transparency questions through the lens of its key stakeholders).
197. Examples of civil society arguments can be found in sources cited supra note 36. Most of the
amicus briefs that have been filed in investor-state disputes can be downloaded on the Investment
Treaty Arbitration website. INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION (Mar. 14, 2014), http://italaw.com.

2014]

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ININVESTMENT LAW

415

tional associations derived from particular viewpoints can enable the public/private rhetoric to take the place of considered deliberation. Decisions
concerning how to reconcile conflicting interests in a particular investment
dispute then become implicit in the choice of labels applied. Second, this
maneuver supplies instantaneous decision rules. If the circumstances of an
investment dispute set off an arbitrator's public protection alarm, then he
or she may in good conscience decide the case in favor of the state. If, to
the contrary, they set off the arbitrator's government abuse alarm, he or
she may find for the investor. Finally, if both sets of warning bells sound
simultaneously, the arbitrator may find a way to split the baby. Rational
reasons for any of the three decisions can always be supplied after the
fact.198
One could levy a whole host of criticisms against the idea of applying
emotive associations as decision rules. Indeed, I will devote the remainder
of this Article to showing why the approach I have just described must
give way to an integrated systems perspective on the international investment regime's conflict of rights dilemmas instead. But before moving on
to that final task, I wish to pause for a moment to consider the merits from the point of view of the regime's stakeholders - of the current approach.
The chief advantage of employing latent public/private associations as
decision rules is that the sociological (i.e., political, cultural, ideological,
etc.) predispositions triggering an actor's gut-level reactions need never be
disclosed, let alone critically examined and dealt with. This benefits treaty
negotiators by enabling them to conclude agreements with states whose
value systems differ from their own. 199 It benefits investors by streamlining
negotiations over lucrative state contracts without having to stop and consider how political opposition from non-investors might impact upon the
profitability of the contract (which could impede deal-making).
Sequestering contested values propositions away in a black box also
benefits civil society groups, whether "public interest" groups or industry
groups. They get to espouse their emotive stories, and sometimes achieve
their preferred outcomes, while dodging thorny questions concerning what
makes their values important or valid or legitimate, and why their values
should trump the potentially equally valid competing values of others.
198. See general# MARTi KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (2005).

199. A number of scholars explain the phenomenon of vague treaty provisions as instances in
which the negotiating states could not actually agree on the meaning to be given to a particular provision. The idea is that states sometimes intentionally leave provisions open-ended in order to conclude
the treaty, which effectively shifts the task of establishing the provision's meaning to some future
dispute resolution process.
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Scholars similarly gain the freedom to conceive of, and promote, theoretical approaches to the investment law regime's public/private problems,
which, if implemented, would result in the privileging of their particular
normative suppositions over those of others.
All of these efforts to promote contested viewpoints by dressing them
up in public/private rhetoric share something in common: they all effectively shift the task of deciding between competing value propositions to
the dispute resolution level of the regime. This explains why investor-state
arbitration tribunals have become the major object of attack from all quarters. Woe to the arbitrators, one might say!200 Yet herein lies the rub. Investment arbitrators tend to be accomplished individuals of high repute
who strive to render decisions in a manner that is consistent with their
own personal values. 201 Understandably, however, they have no more desire than anyone else to submit those values to general scrutiny. And because arbitrators sit at the pinnacle of all of this ongoing systemic contestation, they are the ones who stand to benefit most by taking cover behind
seemingly clear-cut decision rules. This, in turn, explains why many of the
regime's most difficult base questions have remained perpetually unanswered.
To admit this is not to endorse the status quo, but merely to
acknowledge the gravitational pull of the regime's present course. I now
turn to consider what might be done to move the international investment
law debate beyond the cyclical trap of public/private smoke and mirrors in
the future.
III. THE INTEGRATED SYSTEMS APPROACH
I have argued that there can be no neutral ordering as between public
and private rights within international investment law, nor between public
governance and private dispute settlement; the operative value decisions
inhere in the labeling exercise itself. As Karl Llewellyn put it in his discussion of the use of precedent in the 1930s (presaging international investment law's jurisprudential inconsistency problem by some decades):
If deduction does not solve cases, but only shows the effect of a
given premise; and if there is available a competing but equally authoritative premise that leads to a different conclusion - then
there is a choice in the case; a choice to be justified; a choice which
200. With apologies to Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Vae Victis or Woe to the Negoiators!: Your Treaty or
Our '7nterpretadon" of it?, 65 AM. J. INT'L. L. 358 (1971) (reviewing Myres S. McDougal et al., THE
INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1967)).

201. Indeed, the majority of arbitrators are likely appointed precisely because of their values, or at
least their known viewpoints.

2014]

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN INVESTMENT LAW

can be justified only as a question of policy tradition speaks with a forked tongue.202

417

for the authoritative

This statement rings even truer in international investment law, which has
no doctrine of precedent and an even greater diversity of "competing but
equally authoritative premises" than the constitutionally constrained common law system Llewellyn was analyzing. I therefore propose, as did Llewellyn, "[1]et this be recognized[.]" 203
Effectuating this recognition requires international investment lawyers
to move beyond the current categorical debate. I suggest that we do so by
analyzing the regime from an integrated systems perspective. In the remainder of the Article, I explain how this proposal works and why it is
better able to address international investment law's most pressing problems than the existing public governance and private dispute settlement
modes of analysis.
A. IntegratedSystems Anaysis and its PotentialUtility
The term "system" can of course mean different things to different
people. It is therefore pertinent to note some of the principal ideas with
which the term has been associated and explain how these relate to the
more pragmatic notion of an "integrated system" I employ here.
Within the life sciences community, the branch of study known as systems theory sprang up from a broad array of scientific and philosophical
roots over the course of the twentieth century. The person credited with
first articulating it in a rigorous form was Ludwig von Bertalanffy, an Austrian-born biologist.204 Bertalanffy criticized the traditional method of biological study, which tended to "equate the structure of the organism with
that of the machine" - a "conglomeration of separate elements" - and
viewed it as "something static, acting only under external influence". 205 In
202. Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realksm about Realism - Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV.
1222, 1252-53 (1931) (footnotes omitted).
203. Id at 1253.
204. Bertalanffy developed his views on theoretical biology and general systems theory from the
1920s through the 1970s. Some of his best known works include: LUDWIG VON BERTALANFFY,
THEORETISCHE BIOLOGIE (2d ed. 1932-1942); LUDWIG VON BERTALANFFY, VOM MOLEKt)L ZUR
ORGANISMENWELT (1949); LUDWIG VON BERTALANFFY, PROBLEMS OF LIFE: AN EVALUATION
OF MODERN BIOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT (1952); LUDWIG VON BERTALANFFY,
BIOPHYSIK DES FLIESSGLEICHGEWICHTS (1953); Ludwig von Bertalanffy, A/gemeine Systemtheorie und

die Einheit der Wlissenschaften, Atti del XII Congresso Internazionale di Filosofia, vol. IV, Firenze
(1962); LUDWIG VON BERTALANFFY, ROBOTS, MEN AND MINDS (1967); LUDWIG VON
BERTALANFFY, ORGANISMIC PSYCHOLOGY AND SYSTEMS THEORY (1968); LUDWIG VON
BERTALANFFY, GENERAL SYSTEM THEORY: FOUNDATIONS, DEVELOPMENT, APPLICATIONS
(1971).
205. IV. BLAUBERG, V.N. SADOVSKY & E.G. YUDIN, SYSTEMS THEORY: PHILOSOPHICAL AND

METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS 44 (Sergei Syrovatkin & Olga Germogenova trans., 1977) (emphasis
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place of this limiting view, Bertalanffy made the case for an open systems
approach to biology which saw the organism as an active and continually
changing system that possessed internal organization and wholeness. He
insisted that the best way to study organisms was to take a dynamic approach - a view he later generalized to scientific study writ large as well as
to philosophy.206
Bertalanffy's analysis proved at once simple and powerful, and it has
since been taken up with enthusiasm by scholars in other fields. In legal
scholarship, perhaps the best-known contributions have come from Niklas
Luhmann 207 and Gunther Teubner. 208 These scholars describe law as an
"autopoietic" system - a self-referential communicative process which
recursively constitutes and maintains itself.209 In this depiction, a legal system's particular set of self-referencing relationships is what differentiates
the system from its surrounding environment, and the communicative acts
that instantiate and validate these relationships are what enable the system
to generate a cohesive internal order amidst a sea of external complexity
and chaos. Autopoietically autonomous systems are then postulated to be
connected to one another and to their environment through "structural
couplings" - designated pathways through which information from the
outside can enter, be processed by, and relayed throughout the system. 210
In short, for Luhmann and Teubner, social systems - whether legal,
political, or otherwise - are at once "operatively closed" and "cognitively
open". That is, although they are structurally self-referential, they are nevertheless connected to, and able to respond to, information emanating
from outside of their own self-constructed boundaries. 211
More recently, the rise of complex adaptive systems theory has colored
the word "system" with yet another set of influential ideas. In simplified
omitted).
206. Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General System Theog as IntegratingFactor in Contenporay Sience andin
Philosophy, in Akten des XIV Internationalen Kongresses fir Philosophie, Wien, Osterreich, Sept. 2-9,
1968, Bd. 11,at 335-40.
207. See principal# NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM (Klaus A. Ziegert trans., 2004);
NILAS LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW 281-88 (Martin Albrow ed., Edith KingUtz & Martin Albrow trans., 1985).
208. GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM (European Univ. Press 1993).
209. The term autopoeisis comes from the Greek nOTo-(auto-), meaning "self", and noifnoai
(poiesir),meaning "creation, production."
210. LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM, supranote 207, ch. 10.

211. Teubner in particular has vigorously defended the notions of operational closure and cognitive openness against attacks from later "open systems" theorists. See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, Introduction to Autopoietic Law, in AUTOPOIETIC LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY 1, 2 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987) ("A radical closure of the system -

under certain conditions -

means its

radical openness. This is one of the most challenging theses of autopoietic theory. The more the legal
system gains in operational closure and autonomy, the more it gains in openness toward social facts,
political demands, social science theories, and human needs.").
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terms, a complex adaptive system is "a system in which large networks of
components with no central control and simple rules of operation give rise
to complex collective behavior, sophisticated information processing, and
adaptation via learning or evolution." 2 12
All of these branches of systems scholarship are fascinating, and it is
easy to imagine how each might yield insight into the functioning of the
international investment law regime. But it is not my present aim to provide a definitive exposition of the various branches of systems theory or
to debate their merits at an abstract level.213 Nor do I seek to establish the
superiority of one branch over the others as an analytical lens for the study
of the investment regime. My goal is instead much more limited and concrete. Namely, if I am correct about the malleable and interdependent nature of the investment regime's "public" and "private" characteristics, then
it seems plausible that at least some of the regime's major sources of dissatisfaction might be addressed through minor interventions within the
existing regime. Viewing the regime as an integrated system - in the
common-sense notion of the phrase supplies a simple conceptual
framework with which to test this hypothesis.
There are at least three reasons to believe that the exercise might prove
fruitful. First, as I have emphasized above, the international investment law
regime consists of many moving parts. It rests upon a complex web of
thousands of overlapping treaties, investment statutes, and contracts. It
encompasses hundreds of arbitral decisions issued by arbitrators from
dozens of different countries applying numerous different bodies of law.
And it impacts in complex ways upon investors, states, and a broad swath
of other individuals and groups.
Second, much like Bertalanffy's living organism, all of these moving
parts display a pattern of internal organization and wholeness. As in
Luhmann and Teubner's description, the investment regime's organization
is not hierarchical, but rather communicative in nature. Its substantive legal
obligations are generatedvariably by treaty negotiators, domestic legislatures,
specific investors, and host state officials. They are then concretiZed by counsel, expert witnesses, and arbitrators over the course of successive investor-state disputes. A small but non-exclusive set of arbitration-related institutions, meanwhile, mediates the way in which investment law principles are
212. MELANIE MITCHELL, COMPLEXITY: A GUIDED TOUR 13 (2009); see also John H. Holland,
Studying Compkx Adaptive Systems, 19 J. SYs. SCI. & COMPLEXITY 1 (2006), available at http://hdl.han
dle.net/2027.42/41486 (defining CAS as "systems that have a large numbers of components, often
called agents, that interact and adapt or learn').
213. For an extensive critique of the biological theory and its application, see BLAUBERG,
SADOVSKY & YUDIN, supra note 205, pt. II. For a critique of Luhmann's social systems theory, see
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developed and applied by promulgating different procedural rules and
processes for the conduct of investor-state arbitration.
Once a specific award has been issued, domestic courts in the enforcing
state determine whether to enforce the award (under the New York Convention),214 or the executive branch of the host state decides whether to comply
with the award (under the ICSID Convention). 215 On the back end, civil
society groups of all sorts attempt to shift the regime in the direction of
their respective competing normative preferences by pressuring states to
change substantive law, institutions to change procedural practices, arbitrators to change interpretive methodologies, and courts to change enforcement schemes. In short, the international investment law regime's many
layers are systemically organized and thickly interconnected via multidirectional feedback loops.
Third, each of the international investment law system's constituent
sub-parts is active, not static (as emphasized by complex adaptive systems
accounts), with the result that the system as a whole is dynamically evolving in real time. New states continue to join the ICSID Convention each
year, 216 and many countries remain committed to concluding new investment treaties. On the other hand, some states have registered their disapprobation of what they regard as the regime's excessive encroachment upon their regulatory powers. They have done so by pulling out of the
ICSID Convention, 217 narrowing the scope of their treaty-based substantive obligations, 218 terminating existing bilateral investment treaties, 219 or
214. The New York Convention, supra note 2, allows the courts of an enforcing state to refuse
recognition or enforcement if granting it would violate the public policy of the enforcing state.
215. The ICSID Convention, supra note 2, obligates all states parties to comply with any award issued under the Convention. In practice, most states do, with the notable recent exceptions of Argentina and Zimbabwe.
216. The list of states that either signed or ratified the ICSID Convention between Jan. 1, 2010
and July 25, 2012 includes: Cape Verde, Montenegro, Qatar, and South Sudan. ICSID, List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention, ICSID Doc. ICSID/3 (May 20, 2013), available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=C
ontractingStates&ReqFrom=Main.
217. Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela have all formally denounced the ICSID Convention (in
2007, 2009, and 2012, respectively), and Nicaragua has threatened to do so. Press Release, Bolivia
Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention (May 16, 2007), https://icsid.worldba
nk.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=Announce
Press Release, Ecuador
mentsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=Announcement3;
Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention (July 9, 2009), https://icsid.worldbank.
org/ICSID/FrontServiet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=Announcemen
tsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=Announcement20; Press Release, Venezuela Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention (Jan. 26, 2012), https://icsid.worldbank.
org/ICSID/FrontServet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal= OpenPage&PageType=Announcemen
tsFrame&FromPage=Announcements&pageName=Announcementl00.
218. The United States and Canada have moved to narrow the scope of their obligations to foreign investors, both by issuing restrictive ex post interpretations of NAFTA and by amending the
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moving to exclude investor-state arbitration from future investment
agreements. 220
Prominent arbitrators, in turn, are reacting to these developments in a
proactive manner. It is not uncommon nowadays to see arbitrators lambasting other arbitrators in the form of scathing dissents, 221 public speeches,222 or scholarly articleS223 whenever they fear that a particular award's
interpretation of a state's obligations toward a foreign investor has either
gone too far or stopped too short. A few even appear to have reversed
course as a result of these exchanges, departing from their own past arbitral decisions in some instances. 224
Consistent with the notion of cognitive openness, these re-alignments
suggest that dynamic potential rests in each of the international investment law system's many joints. This should be music to the ears of critics
who are unhappy with the current status quo. It means that it might well
be possible to address some of the regime's most pressing problems without having to resolve the intractable public system/private system debate.
In the next Section, I demonstrate how this might work in practice by illustrating three ways in which the degree of protection afforded to investor
model texts upon which their future bilateral investment treaties will be negotiated. For contrasting
appraisals of these developments, compare Stephen M. Schwebel, The United States 2004 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty. An Exenise in the Regressive Development of InternationalLaw, TRANSNAT'L DIsP.
MGMT., Apr. 2006, http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=780;
STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL, JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: FURTHER SELECTED WRITINGS 152

(2011); Roberts, supra note 67.
219. Jana Marais, South Africa, European Union Lock Horns, BUSINESS DAY LIVE (Sept. 23, 2012),
http://www.bdlive.co.za/businesstimes/2012/09/23/south-africa-european-union-lock-horns
(reporting that South Africa has terminated its bilateral investment treaty with Belgium and Luxembourg and has announced its intention to terminate its BITs with all other European states).
220. Luke Eric Peterson, In Policy Switch, Australa Disavows Needfor Investor-State Arbitration Provisions in Trade and Investment Agreements, INVESTMENT ARB. REP. (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.iarepor
ter.com/articles/20110414.
221. Arbitrator Pedro Nikken wrote a pointed dissent from the above-discussed Suet Decision on
Liability, supra note 77, for example. See Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., v. Argentine Republic, ARB/03/17, Separate Opinion of Arbitrator Pedro Nikken (July 30, 2010), available
at http://italaw.com/documents/SuezVivendiAWGSeparateOpinion.pdf.
222. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 13.
223. See, e.g., Brigitte Stem, ICSID Arbitraion and the State's Increasing Remote Consent: Apropos the
Maffezini Case, in LAW IN THE SERVICE

OF HUMAN

DIGNITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR

OF

FLORENTINo FELICIANO 246 (Steve Chamovitz et al. eds., 2005).
224. Most recently, arbitrator Domingo Bello Janeiro completely recanted his previous interpretation of the Argentina-Germany BIT's jurisdictional requirements for the institution of investor-state
arbitration proceedings. See Daimler Fin. Servs. AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/1, Award (Aug. 22, 2012), available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-docume
nts/ital082.pdf; Daimler Fin. Servs. AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Separate Opinion of Arbitrator Domingo Bello Janeiro (Aug. 16, 2012) (recanting his earlier holding on
the same question in Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on
Jurisdiction (Aug. 3, 2004)), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ital084.pdf).
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versus non-investor rights at one level of the regime can be significantly
shifted by introducing a modest change at some other level of the regime.
The idea, with each example, is to take advantage of at least one of the
regime's dynamic feedback loops - to treat it, in other words, as an integrated system.
B. Three Illustrations:How IntegratedSystems Analysis Can Be Used To
Reshape InternationalInvestment Law
1. A Textual Reform
At present, few if any investment treaties contain a clause specifying the
manner in which arbitrators should take into account a host state's various
obligations toward non-claimants when interpreting that state's obligations
toward a particular foreign investor under the treaty.225 Several commentators have stressed that articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties provide guidance in this matter.226 Unfortunately, the Vienna Convention has proven insufficient to ensure much consistency of
approach in practice. 227 Tribunal members tend to interpret treaty provisions in accordance with their understanding of the regime's essential
function - whether as a private dispute settlement system, a public governance system, or otherwise. 228 This generates inconsistent interpretations
of the same treaty provisions, which raises rule of law concerns. More
troubling still, from a regulatory point of view, it results in the line between investor rights and non-investor rights being drawn in different
places by different tribunals from one case to the next, even under the
same treaty.
Suppose a state were to address this problem by inserting an explicit interpretive clause of the following sort into all of its investment treaties: 229
225. Some investment treaties, like the U.S. MODEL BIT 2012, supra note 21, contain exceptions
clauses for certain types of governmental measures, but I have yet to see a treaty with a general interpretive clause.
226. See, e.g., Pierre-Marie Dupuy & Jorge Vifiuales, Human Rights and Investment Disap,/nes:Integraion in Progrss,in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, pt. 4.B (M. Bungenberg et al. eds., forthcoming 2012).
227. On the regime's jurisprudential inconsistency problems, see Franck, supra note 35; Maupin,
supra note 66.
228. Seegeneral Roberts, supra note 107.
229. Note that some treaties outside of the investment law context do contain clauses specifying
how they are to be interpreted when their provisions come into conflict with the provisions of other
treaties. See, e.g., art. 22 of the Convention on Biological Diversity, which states: "[t]he provisions of
this Convention shall not affect the rights and obligations of any Contracting Party deriving from any
existing international agreement, except where the exercise of those rights and obligations would
cause a serious damage or threat to biological diversity." Convention on Biological Diversity art.
22(1), June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79.
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Interpretation & Application
When interpreting and applying this treaty in any dispute between a
Contracting Party ["the host State"] and an investor of the other
Contracting Party ["the investor"], a tribunal:
1) Must explicitly address in its written decision any conflicts as
may arise, on the facts of the dispute, between the host State's
obligations toward the claimant(s) under this treaty and its concomitant legal obligations toward parties other than the claimant(s) which derive from:
a) the provisions of this treaty;
b) other international agreements to which the host State is a
party; and
c)

the fundamental rights provisions contained in the host
State's highest domestic law.

2) Must calculate the amount of compensation due to claimant(s)
by reason of the host State's violation of any provision of this
treaty in such a manner as to avoid making it infeasible, either
in law or in fact, for the host State to simultaneously satisfy its
obligations to the claimant under this treaty and its concomitant obligations to other persons under the bodies of law specified in paragraph (1) above.
What impact might this interpretive clause have upon a competing
rights dilemma of the kind raised by the Suet v. Argentina water privatization dispute profiled above?230 Quite evidently, a tribunal applying this
clause would be precluded from resolving the dispute in the superficial "no
de jure conflict" manner adopted by the SueZ tribunal. The tribunal would
instead be obliged to address the potential defacto conflict between Argentina's human rights obligation - to ensure uninterrupted access to water
to the citizens of Buenos Aires - and its contractual obligation - to ensure a pre-specified rate of return to the claimants. And if, as the dissenting arbitrator in Suet argued, the financial crisis rendered Argentina temporarily incapable of directly subsidizing the price of water at the stipulated
contractual level in the wake of the massive depreciation of the peso, the
tribunal would be forced to adjust its compensation award accordingly.231
230. See general# Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., v. Argentine Republic,

ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability (July 30, 2010), available at http://italaw.com/sit
es/default/files/case-documents/ita0826.pdf.
231. Dissenting arbitrator Pedro Nikken, a human rights lawyer by background, suggested the
tribunal should have excused Argentina from abiding by the original contractual terms during the
acute portion of the crisis but required Argentina to re-establish the contractual equilibrium once
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At the initial award stage of the international investment law regime, then,
this type of interpretive clause would result in shifting the balance struck
between investor rights and non-investor rights in the direction of noninvestors.
The billiard balls do not stop there, however. How might the clause
subsequently impact upon developments at the review and enforcement
level of the regime? By staving off the issuance of awards that place states
between a legal (or financial) rock and a hard place, the inclusion of this
type of interpretive clause could well lead to a decrease in the percentage
of annulment and set-aside requests lodged by states under the applicable
enforcement conventions. 232 This would most likely improve payout rates
on arbitral awards by reducing the political cost of compliance for the respondent state. 233 It might even soften civil society opposition to the regime, thereby reducing the pressure on states to either abandon the regime
or narrow the scope of their substantive legal commitments to foreign
investors. All three of these developments would move the balance back
toward the investor side of the equation. Moreover, by providing guidance
on how conflicts between investor rights under an investment treaty and
the rights of non-investors will be resolved, an interpretive clause would
improve legal certainty for both investors and states. This would allow investors to build more accurate regulatory risk assessments into their investment planning. States, for their part, would enjoy greater certainty as to
the limits of their potential financial liability to foreign investors when undertaking governmental regulatory activities.
2. An InstitutionalReform
One difficulty with any textual reform of the sort just proposed is that
it could only be implemented comprehensively by amending or replacing
some 3000 existing treaties - a difficult and lengthy process. 234 The major
Argentina had sufficiently recovered from the crisis (which Argentina failed to do). Suez, Sociedad
General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., v. Argentine Republic, ARB/03/17, Separate Opinion of Arbitrator Pedro Nikken, T 35-44 (July 30, 2010), availabe at http://italaw.com/documents/SuezViven
diAWGSeparateOpinion.pdf.
232. Between 1965 and 2000, ICSID tribunals issued around five original arbitral awards for every annulment decision (annulment proceedings were thus initiated in respect of about 16% of the
awards). From 2001 to 2010, the ratio was 3.7:1 (annulment proceedings initiated in respect of 21%
of awards). In 2011, the ratio climbed to 2.1:1 (annulment proceedings initiated in respect of 30% of
awards). See ICSID CASELOAD, supra note 24, at 15 chart 8. To my knowledge, there are no similar
statistics available in respect of set-aside proceedings registered under the New York Convention.
233. Contrast this to the current situation, in which several investors hold large awards against
Argentina in consequence of the measures taken in response to the country's 2001 financial crisis, but
Argentina has so far refused to pay any of them, probably because to do so would be to commit
political suicide.
234. It should be noted, however, that the European Union's plan to replace 1407 bilateral in-
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arbitral institutions that administer investor-state disputes, on the other
hand, do not face the same kinds of collective action and bargaining power dilemmas faced by treaty negotiators. ICSID has already taken advantage of this fact on at least one prior occasion. In 2006, it amended its
procedural rules to stipulate that ICSID tribunals may accept amicus curiae
briefs from non-disputing parties and that the ICSID Secretariat would
begin publishing final awards - or at the very least excerpts of their underlying legal reasoning - on its website. 235
Suppose ICSID similarly decided, of its own initiative, to take up the
challenge of ensuring that investor-state tribunals take account of noninvestor rights when deciding investor-state disputes adjudicated under the
ICSID arbitration rules. There are several ways in which it might approach
the task. One possibility would be to add a step to the procedural intake
process. Upon certifying the constitution of a new tribunal, the ICSID
Secretariat typically designates one of its legal counsels to act as secretary
to the tribunal. These individuals are highly competent and experienced
lawyers who labor, at the pleasure of ICSID's member countries, as international civil servants. They provide a broad range of services for ICSID
tribunals behind the scenes.
Suppose that at the time of this designation, the secretary is tasked with
preparing a memo on the basis of the initial request for arbitration and the
respondent state's response to the initial request. In this memo, the secretary flags the potential conflicts of rights that he or she perceives might
arise on the facts as between the host state's investment law-based obligations to the claimant and its obligations to other persons arising out of the
bodies of law specified in the above-proposed interpretive clause. The secretary then provides the memo to the tribunal and to the parties, and the
Secretariat also publishes the memo on the ICSID website.
In the Phih Morris claim described above, for example, the secretary
might note the following potential sources of conflict. Australian law creates and limits the scope of intellectual property rights within the territory
of Australia. In addition, several international treaties govern the obligations of states in recognizing and protecting within their borders the intellectual property rights granted by other states. Among these, Australia is a
party to: the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
vestment treaties with new comprehensive EU-wide treaties may make the textual reform route a
very viable possibility in the near future. See general Julie A. Maupin, Whe Should Europe's Investment
PathLead? Relctions on August Reinisch, 'Quo Vadis Eurmpe?," 12 SANTA CLARAJ. INT'L L. 183 (2013).
235. See ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND RULES, rules 48, 53, ICSID/15, 4 I.L.M. 524
(2006), available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRREnglish-nal.pdf;
ICSID, ICSID Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules, art. 53, ICSID Doc. ICSID/1 1 (2006), available
at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/facility/AFR-English-final.pdf.
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Property Rights, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, and the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.236 It is also a
party to the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, which requires Australia to use all reasonable efforts to reduce smoking,237 including through the use of tobacco packaging regulations. 238
The major weakness of such a secretarial memo is that it would have no
legal force in the arbitration proceedings. Disputing parties are always free
to develop and defend their arguments however they see fit, and the tribunal hearing the dispute must remain free, as before, to direct the proceedings and resolve the claims entirely in accordance with its authorized discretion.
Nonetheless, the mere fact of the publication of the secretary's memo
would likely produce three results. First, it would alert outside persons to
the existence of legal questions in respect of which they may have an interest in submitting amicus briefs. Second, it would alert the tribunal to the
potential that the dispute may raise controversial conflicts between the investors' claims and the competing claims of others who are not before the
tribunal, which - if not dealt with delicately - could ultimately impact
upon the award's enforceability. 239 Third, it would frame the questions
raised in a comprehensive and less partisan manner than would otherwise
be the case were the questions to receive their initial framing solely from
the self-interested pleadings of the disputing parties.
Whether or not this practice would affect the arbitral outcomes of individual disputes is anyone's guess. But looking at the proposal from the integrated systems perspective once again raises some interesting possible
interaction effects. A tribunal that paid heed to the issues raised in the secretary's memo might find itself better insulated against an attempt, by one
of the disputing parties, to annul the award on the grounds that the tribunal either failed to apply the applicable law or failed to state reasons for its
decision. 240 Here again, this scenario might prove more investor friendly
236. As pointed out by the claimants in Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia,
UNCITRAL, Notice of Arbitration, 16 (Nov. 21, 2011), available at http://www.ag.gov.au/Internatio
nalrelations/IntemationalLaw/Documents/Philip%20Morris%2OAsia%20Limited%20Notice%200f
%20Arbitration%2021%20November%20201 I.pdf.
237. See WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, opened for signatum June 16, 2003,
2302 U.N.T.S. 166, art. 5(3) (entered into force Feb. 27, 2005) ("In setting and implementing their
public health policies with respect to tobacco control, Parties shall act to protect these policies from
commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry in accordance with national law.").
238. Id art. 11.
239. Jan Paulsson has recently argued that tribunals should take public policy into account when
rendering their decisions, since producing an enforceable award is one of their primary duties. Alison
Ross, Seou Paulsson Ponders Pubc Pocy, GLOBAL ARB. REv., June 21, 2012, at 42.
240. These are two of the most frequently cited grounds for annulment under the ICSID Con-
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than the alternative, since an award that is overly dismissive of noninvestor rights may be more susceptible of annulment or non-payment. 241
There could also be some inter-institutional competition effects. 242
Many investment treaties allow investors to choose among several arbitral
fora when initiating a claim. Thus, if ICSID were to adopt the practice of
publicizing this kind of secretarial intake memo, investors who wish to
avoid a public vetting of potential conflicts between their claims and the
rights of non-disputing parties might opt for a non-ICSID arbitral forum
instead. Such a development could shift the balance away from noninvestors and toward investors.
But here again, countervailing reactions are to be expected. Civil society
advocates might well respond by dropping their opposition to ICSID and
re-directing their lobbying efforts against non-ICSID arbitral forums. If
so, this could prompt states to eliminate from their treaties the provisions
that allow investors to choose among forums. The mere threat of this possibility might even persuade the non-ICSID arbitration institutions to
adopt the secretarial memo practice as well. Here again, it is difficult to
predict precisely what new equilibrium between investor and non-investor
rights this proposal would generate in the end. What is clear, however, is
that it could effectuate a significant recalibration of the system no less
than the more cumbersome textual reform route posited above.
3. An Enforcement Reform
As a third possibility, suppose that states who are concerned about the
preservation of their regulatory space are unable to persuade some of
their investment treaty partners to adopt any kind of treaty revision
(whether an interpretive clause or otherwise). Suppose further that institutional culture and related reasons prevent not only ICSID, but all of the
major arbitration institutions from adopting any kind of institutional reform.243 Would this mark the end of the story, making all internal systemsvennon.
241. This has been demonstrated by the recent split decisions of arbitral tribunals and ad hoc annulment committees concerning the scope and effect of Argentina's necessity defense under both
treaty law and customary international law. See Jiurgen Kurtz, Adjudging the Exceptional at International
Investment Law: Secuity, Pubc Orderand FinancialCrisis, 59 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 325 (2010); Andrea K
Bjorklund, Emergeng Exceptions: State of Necessity and Force Majeure, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 459 (Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino,& Christoph Schreuer
eds., 2008) (discussing the split decisions).
242. To my knowledge, there has been very little comparative investigation of the role played by
the major arbitral institutions and their procedural rules, including ICSID, the PCA, ICC, LCIA,
SCC, and UNCITRAL. I have outlined one possible research agenda, which I hope to take up in the
near future, in Maupin, supra note 196.
243. This is a real possibility, as evidenced by the continual failure of the UNCITRAL II Working
Group to fulfill the Commission's 2008 mandate to promulgate a new set of arbitration rules specifi-
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inspired reform proposals dead in the water? Not necessarily. States still
control multiple levers within the system, and they can press on these at
any time. 244
A state that is unhappy with ICSID can withdraw from the ICSID Convention on six months' written notice 245 - as Venezuela, Ecuador, and
Bolivia have all done.246 This move does not insulate the exiting state from
future investor-state claims, since many investment treaties allow investors
to bring claims in other arbitral fora. Even so, withdrawing from the
ICSID Convention might allow the state, at the enforcement level of the
regime, to exercise a greater degree of control over how arbitral tribunals
balance investors' rights against non-investment concerns. This is because
investment arbitration awards issued outside of the ICSID framework are
subject to enforcement under the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Unlike the ICSID
Convention, the New York Convention allows states to refuse to recognize
or enforce a foreign arbitral award on certain public policy grounds. 247
These include circumstances in which enforcing the award would violate
the public policy of the enforcing state and cases where the award has
been set aside by a competent authority of the state under whose law the
award was made. 24 8
An example from the U.S. enforcement context will help to clarify how
these facts might be used to alter the balance between investor and noninvestor rights in practice. What would happen if Philip Morris, having
obtained a several billion-dollar award against Australia as compensation
for its lost profits under the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act, sought to enforce the award by attaching Australian assets in the United States? The
U.S. court considering the attachment request would look to the Federal
Arbitration Act, which gives domestic effect to the New York Convention. 24 9 Motivated by commercial efficiency justifications, U.S. courts have
developed a longstanding tradition of respecting the finality of arbitral
awards under this Act.

cally tailored to the needs of treaty-based (as distinct from purely commercial) arbitrations.
244. This implies, of course, that civil society groups can pressure them to do so.
245. ICSID Convention, supra note 2, art. 71.
,246. See sources cited supra note 217.
247. Much of the existing scholarship on the two conventions compares their parallel provisions
or reviews how these have been applied in specific cases. But since investors can often choose which
of the two conventions their disputes will proceed under, what is needed is an analysis of the interplay between the two enforcement systems.
248. New York Convention, supra note 2, art. V.
249. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. % 1-14 (1970). In more monist systems, the corresponding provisions of the New York Convention would apply directly.
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There is good reason to think a U.S. court might prove less amenable to
enforcing an award like the hypothetical Philip Morris one, however. An
award against Australia on the facts of the Philip Morris dispute would
essentially amount to an international finding of a domestic regulatory taking. When it comes to foreign regulatory measures, U.S. courts tend to
show a high degree of deference to foreign states for reasons of both
comity and reciprocity. After all, U.S. regulators do not wish to see their
own regulatory actions result in the attachment of U.S. government-owned
assets abroad. These considerations would weigh all the more heavily if
the arbitral award were to be formally set aside by the Australian courts. 250
Even if current U.S. judicial practice did not portend enforcement
problems in cases like Phih) Morris v. Australia, the U.S. legislature could
move to preempt the question altogether by amending the Federal Arbitration Act.2 51 It could do this, for example, by directing the courts to apply a
stricter type of public policy review when considering the enforcement of
treaty-based and statute-based arbitration awards which grant investors
monetary compensation on account of a foreign sovereign's regulatory
measures. 252
Bifurcating the review standards under the New York Convention in
this fashion would be unorthodox, but it would offer three key advantages.
First, it would not impede commerce by upending a country's tradition of
respecting the finality of arbitral awards in ordinary breach of contract
situations. Second, in disputes where one of the scenarios originally envisaged by the investment law regime's member states materializes - namely,
outright governmental expropriation or physical destruction of a particular
foreign investor's property253 - the enforcement process would remain
smooth and swift. Third, in cases where the underlying cause of action is a
generally applicable sovereign regulatory measure, a bifurcated review
standard would allow different states to follow variegated enforcement
policies tailored to the strictures of their internal constitutional structures

250. As it quite likely would be, given that the Australian High Court has already found the maligned Tobacco Plain Packaging Act to be consistent with the Australian constitution.
251. Argentina and Zimbabwe have shown that outright refusal to pay out on investor-state
awards is also an option. But as this flies in the face of the rule of law, I would hesitate to endorse it
so long as other, perfectly legal, means of addressing systemic problems (such as the legislative fix I
suggest) might be pursued.
252. The basic idea here is that domestic courts in enforcing states should review the awards of
investor-state tribunals more closely, on public policy grounds, whenever there is reason to doubt
that the institutional process underlying the award will guarantee that the tribunal took sufficient
account of the respondent state's competing obligations to non-investors.
253. See, e.g.,Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. (AAPL) v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No.
ARB/87/3, Final Award (June 27, 1990) (claim for compensation for complete destruction of shrimp
farm by government military forces during battle with Tiger rebels).
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and the preferences of their domestic constituencies. 254 This would effectively re-introduce a considerable measure of democratic (or at least domestic) accountability to the investor-state arbitration system on the back
end, at least in respect of the category of cases that is most likely to raise
significant domestic and international policy concerns.
In the end, the degree to which the bifurcated enforcement reform I
suggest would move the regime's balance from the investor to the noninvestor side of the equation would depend upon the policy decisions of
each state's domestic legislature, as well as the degree of deference to such
decisions shown by the enforcing courts of other states. 255 These nuances
aside, the larger point is that any enforcement reform is likely to have a
significant impact upon the way in which arbitrators decide investor-state
disputes, since arbitrators whose awards exhibit a high rate of nonenforcement will lose out on future appointments.
4. Summary of IntegratedSystems Based Reforms
What the three foregoing examples show is that treaty negotiators, arbitral institutions, domestic legislators, civil society advocates, and arbitrators
all have it within their power to make moves that prompt other actors
within the regime to adjust their behavior. Each of these moves entails
ripple effects that reverberate throughout the system. Even minor moves
at one level of the regime can produce major shifts in the way in which the
regime impacts upon investor versus non-investor rights and interests in
practice.
Because some reforms may be additive in their effect while others work
at cross-purposes, the best way to strategically direct the evolution of this
dynamic integrated system is to experiment with minor changes in a successive fashion. The difficult part is determining which experiments should
be performed first. The answer will depend upon which specific elements
of the regime's current legitimacy and accountability deficits one finds
most troubling. The integrated systems approach cannot answer this normative question. Its chief virtues, rather, are descriptive and predictive. 256

254. Some countries, notably within the European Union, are quite comfortable with the idea of
submitting to supranational judicial review of domestic regulatory measures. Others, such as the
United States, are much less.
255. Historically, participating states within the New York Convention system have shown a high
degree of deference to the enforcement policy decisions of other member states, as would be expected under existing comity doctrines. There are exceptions, however.
256. See TEUBNER, upra note 208, at I ("Autopoiesis proposes, as a new and promising research
strategy, to identify circular relationships within the legal system and to analyze their internal dynamics and their external interactions!).
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In effect, an integrated systems analysis of international investment law
reveals three things:
* how different types of normatively-motivated reforms can be implemented within the confines of the existing system;
* who within the existing system has incentives to attempt to push the
system, and in which direction they are likely to push; and
* at what points the system is capable of accommodating differentiated,
country-specific approaches while still hanging together as a system.257
My own prescriptive inclination, as revealed by the above three proposals, is to start by trying out different means of ensuring that important
non-investment related policy goals are not overshadowed by the policy
goal of protecting foreign investors. The Suet Abaclat, and Phihp Morris
case studies all underscore the need for recalibration on this point. I therefore advocate beginning the experimental process immediately. But because complex integrated systems can respond to slight stimuli in unpredictable ways, reform strategies should work up incrementally from the
conservative to the more sweeping, allowing sufficient time in between to
see how the system as a whole adapts to each new innovation. In the final
Section of the Article, I explain why this integrated systems approach is
preferable to each of the three major alternatives on offer.
C Comparing the IntegratedSystems Approach to the Alternatives
1. The StatusQuo Alternative
The easiest alternative to dispense with, in my view, is that of maintaining the status quo. The problems I have profiled throughout this Article
are afflicting the international investment law regime with an unprecedented level of turmoil. The system faces pressure to change from within and
without.258 Almost no one is satisfied with the current state of affairs.
States find it too costly, investors find it too unpredictable, and critics find
it too intrusive upon non-investor concerns. Moreover, the regime is already evolving at a rapid pace, albeit not yet in a coherent or uniform di-

257. There is a fourth insight to be gained from the approach, namely how the system responds
to, incorporates, or rebuffs external stimuli from closely related systems (e.g., the WTO system) and
less-closely related systems (e.g., the international human rights system). This avenue of inquiry
promises to be fruitful, but cannot be pursued within the confines of this Article.
258. See, e.g., Investment, Arbitration andSeery: Behind Closed Doors,A HardStruggk to Shed Some light
on a Legal Grey Area, EcONOMIsT, Apr. 23, 2009, at 49, http://www.economist.com/node/1352
7961. Moreover, specialized news publications like the Investment Arbitration Reporter and the
Global Arbitration Review now provide daily reporting and critique of developments in investorstate arbitration.
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rection. To simply sit back and continue to allow the system to evolve
haphazardly would, I argue, be as unwise as it would be unlikely to produce desirable results. Better to learn from the regime's tumultuous history
than to repeat the mistakes of its past. This makes it incumbent upon the
regime's supporters and detractors alike to think through what should be
done about the fact that the international investment law system is today
performing some feats for which it was never designed. 259
2. The MultilateraliZaionAlternadve
An alternative to the status quo approach would be to attempt to
multilateralize the regime. Were it possible to replace the whole patchwork
of overlapping investment instruments, arbitral institutions, enforcement
mechanisms, etc. with a unified regime, many of the regime's consistency
problems would go away. Creating a new, globally uniform system from
the ground up would also give regime architects (principally treaty negotiators and domestic legislatures) the chance to hammer out more democratically legitimate and accountable means of protecting the rights of investors and their investments abroad. Alas, the international community of
states appears unlikely to reach a multilateral accord on investment anytime
soon. Every prior attempt to do so has failed, 260 and civil society opposition to the idea of a multilateral regime has grown to such proportions
that it is no longer even feasible for most countries to put a multilateral
investment agreement on their negotiating agendas.
Even piecemeal centralization proposals have met with resounding rejection in recent years. When the ICSID Secretariat floated the idea of creating an ICSID Appellate Body in order to bring some consistency to the
splintered ICSID arbitral jurisprudence, 261 the proposal was widely reject259. On this point, I note that some scholars are advancing what I consider to be a corollary to
the status quo alternative, which may be deemed the "change in mindset" alternative. On this view,
any necessary adjustments to the regime could be made simply by changing the mindset of the arbitrators who decide investor-state disputes, for example by convincing them to adopt a comparative
public law perspective. See IIL & COMPARATIVE PUBUC LAW, supra note 11; Schill, New Pubc Law
Approach, supra note 11. While I see the appeal of this approach in terms of its ease of implementation, there is little evidence to date to suggest that arbitrators have the necessary incentives to adopt a
changed mindset - at least not in the absence of some kind of structural reform which goes beyond
the usual social compliance norms of the arbitrator community. See, e.g., David Schneiderman, Lgidmag and Rekxiy in InternationalInvestment Arbitration: A New Se#-Restraint?, 1 O&TATI Socio-LEGAL
SERIES, no. 4, at 1 (2011), available at http://opo.isj.net/index.php/oss/articie/view/51/214 (concluding that the arbitrator community has not reflexively responded to major public interest critiques
of the system); Van Harten, supra note 73 (arguing that arbitrators lack the incentives to restrain their
own behavior).
260. For an overview of the multiple failed attempts to create a multilateral agreement to date, see
VAN HARTEN, supra note 11, at 18-23.
261. ICSID Secretariat, Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration, pt. VI
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ed 262 and quickly withdrawn. 263 The difficulty is that states with different
political structures and at differing levels of development cannot seem to
agree on what the overarching values governing any kind of multilateral
regime should be. This disagreement, after all, is why the "investment law
as transnational public governance system" and "investment law as private
dispute settlement system" approaches I described above have little hope
of solving the existing regime's major problems. They begin from opposite
starting points, and there is no super-legislator, no global constitution,
from whence to derive the super-values necessary to prefer one over the
other.264
3.

The Abolition Alternaive

Finally, I come to the million-dollar question (or billion-dollar question,
if you're standing in Australia's, Germany's, or Belgium's shoes): why
should we keep this strange system in which foreign arbitrators sit in
judgment over domestic regulatory actions at all? Why not just abolish the
regime altogether, as some have proposed?
My answer is a pragmatic one. Notwithstanding all of the regime's wellknown problems, it is still not clear whether it is doing more harm or
good, on balance. What has become increasingly clear is that international
investment treaties do not seem to increase investment flows to the countries that sign them. 265 Thus, a major justification for the investment treaty
regime's creation does not hold water. But investment treaties may have
other salutary effects that have not yet been sufficiently explored. For example, they may contribute to the rule of law by inducing governments
with less than exemplary track records to respect due process requirements
when enacting new regulatory measures or carrying out expropriations. 266
(Oct. 22, 2004) (discussion paper).
262. For one critique, see G. Kaufmann-Kohler, In Search ofTranspareng and Consisteng:ICSID Reform Proposal,TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT., Nov. 2005, http://www.transnational-dispute-management.
com/article.asp?key= 608.
263. Interestingly, the U.S.-Chile, U.S.-Morocco, U.S.-Singapore, and U.S.-DR-CAFTA Free
Trade Agreements all contain a provision requiring the contracting parties to each treaty to enter into
negotiations concerning the possible establishment of bilateral (regional, in the case of DR-CAFTA)
appellate mechanisms within a certain period of time after the treaties enter into force. A similar
provision was found in the 2004 U.S. Model BIT, but it was dropped from the recently released 2012
U.S. Model BIT.
264. This has long been the major criticism of the global constitutionalism and global administrative law literatures more broadly. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Touble ith Global Constitutionaksm, 38
TEx. INT'L L.J. 527 (2003).
265. See Yackee, supra note 57, and the empirical studies summarized therein.
266. This justification seems more plausible as applied to host States that have already made a political commitment to improve their internal rule of law (e.g., Mexico, Argentina). Investment treaties
do not seem to deter countries that have not made this commitment from maltreating both foreign-
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Such process improvements could spill over into other areas, thereby promoting good governance and improving respect for human rights - to
the benefit of domestic constituencies and foreigners alike. 267
Moreover, as I have emphasized here, the international investment law
regime does not start and stop with treaties. Surveys of multinational
companies suggest that legal certainty is one of the top ten factors taken
into account in making foreign investment decisions. If this self-reporting
is accurate, then countries with under-developed legal systems would likely
find themselves unable to attract much-needed foreign investment in the
absence of some alternative means of backing up their domestic legal
guarantees. One wonders how much investment the newly created countries of North and South Sudan could attract, for example, if the only recourse available to foreign investors in the event of bad government behavior lay with the domestic Sudanese courts. 268 Investment treaties, contracts, and statutes were devised to address a real problem in need of a real
solution. To abolish the entire system on the grounds that parts of it are
objectionable - without first attempting more targeted fixes - would be
to throw the baby out with the bath water.
Finally, even if the process could be set in motion today, it would take
decades to completely dismantle the present system and would entail massive transition costs. States would first need to go through the formal steps
required to terminate over 3000 treaties under international law.269 Then,
since many of the treaties contain survival clauses, investors would still be
able to bring investor-state claims for an additional ten years after the official date of termination. If the last ten years is any indication, one might
expect to see another 350 claims in that period - many of which would
still raise the kinds of complex regulatory questions described in this Article.
By contrast, the integrated systems perspective I have proposed offers
up a ready-made toolkit with which policymakers, treaty negotiators, lawmakers, arbitrators, institutional employees, civil society advocates, scholars, and others can begin addressing the underlying causes of the international investment law regime's "legitimacy crisis" straight away.270 For this

ers and citizens (e.g., Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Ecuador).
267. For other possible justifications, see Stephan W. Schill, Private Enfofrement of IntemationalInvestment Law Why We Need Investor Standing in BIT Dispute Settlement, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 29 (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010).

268. Indeed, South Sudan is already facing its first ICSID claim. See South Sudan Hit with ICSID
Claimfrom the North, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Sept. 3, 2012).
269. This process is governed by Articles 54-60 of the Vienna Convention. Vienna Convention,
supra note 84, arts. 5"0.
270. On the regime's legitimacy crisis, see discussion supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
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reason, I submit, it promises to be at once more effective and more practicable than more drastic alternatives.
CONCLUSION

This Article has put the debate over international investment law's systemic nature into context. It has shown that the regime's public/private
problematic is really a microcosm of a fundamental problem running
throughout all areas of the law. To ponder whether the international investment regime is a transnational public governance regime or a private
dispute settlement system is to ask the wrong question. International investment law is at once neither and both of these things. They are two
sides of the same coin, and each shapes and defines the other. The better
question, therefore, is to consider how the investment regime and its many
decision-makers should go about handling the inevitable conflicts of
rights, interests, and values that must arise within a complex regime that
serves and impacts upon so many diverse stakeholders.
I have argued that the best method of analyzing this problem is through
an integrated systems perspective. Applying this perspective paves the way
for the conceptualization of experimental, incremental reforms that can be
introduced at multiple levels of the regime. It supplies means of shifting
the overall equilibrium between investor and non-investor rights through a
dynamic, iterative process that is open to input from stakeholders and decision-makers espousing diverse views and operating at numerous different
pressure points. This openness, in itself, makes it possible to begin reducing the international investment law regime's legitimacy and accountability
deficits in the near term. Given the impracticability of more sweeping alternatives at present, it may be that this constitutes not only the best but
also the only way forward. If seized upon with a little bit of tenacity and
creativity, the integrated systems approach just might end up producing a
regime that both investors and non-investors can live with.

